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This dissertation aims at empirically analyzing different aspects of the economics and finan-
cial behaviour of households and the financial decision making of firms using micro data.
Household choices on saving behaviour as well as labour supply are based on preferences,
external factors and exogenous events, both in actual realizations and in expectations. In the
first two chapters, we focus on how inheritance expectations and realizations shape economic
decisions as well as family dissolution decisions. Receiving an inheritance can be conceived
as a plausibly exogenous increase of resources which has, like any windfall gain, an impact on
economic decisions, such as consumption/saving and labour supply decisions. Unlike with
windfall gains, individuals are likely to form and develop their expectations on receiving an
inheritance and on the amount.
In the first study, we investigate whether the expectations on receiving an inheritance act
as a driver for economic choices such as accumulation and decumulation of wealth patterns,
as well as on willingness to bequeath and labour supply decisions. To do so, we use the
DHS dataset from the Netherlands integrated with a module we designed on subjective
probabilities of receiving an inheritance in the near future (in the next ten years). In the
second study, we focus our attention on the effect of having received an inheritance or an
inter-vivos transfer on a more intimate aspect of individuals’ lives: divorcing. In doing that,
we use panel data from the DNB Household Survey between 2002 and 2016. In the third
study, we change country of analysis, focusing on the credit access and credit demand of
Italian firms using RIL cross-section data of 2015.
In Chapter 2, we investigate whether and to what extent the expectations on receiving
an inheritance act as a driver of economic choices; the fact of expecting a wealth endowment
in the future should play a relevant role according to life cycle theory, particularly if the
expected amount is large. We expect that the perspective of receiving a wealth endowment
in the future affects consumption decisions, will make individuals more willing to leave a
bequest, and will induce them to imagine themselves not to be part of the labour force at an
age close enough to the standard retirement age. In our analysis, we use the DNB Household
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Survey (DHS) from the Netherlands, a Dutch panel data set collected by the CentERdata
that allows to study both psychological and economic aspects of financial behaviour; since
we are interested in questions concerning the probability of receiving an inheritance in the
future, we devised a special module asking about subjective probabilities on receiving an
inheritance and the amount of this inheritance (in intervals) in the next ten years. Based
on these expectations, we analyze whether the expected inheritance acts as a deterrent to
saving. Results show that individuals perceive the expected inheritances as a potential
increase of personal wealth, which leads to a reduction in savings; moreover, expectations
appear to matter also in the enhancement of the intention to bequeath and in work versus
leisure choices: indeed, expecting to receive an inheritance increases the chances of leaving
a bequest and reduce chances of working at an age of 62 years old (or higher). Eventually,
considering the fact that money transfers during an individual’s lifetime might shape their
behaviour, we drop those who already benefited of a wealth endowment: even without those
observations, results are robust and in line with our expectations.
The study in Chapter 3 aims at investigating whether receiving an inheritance or another
financial transfer can represent a motivation to increase the chances of getting divorced, us-
ing panel data from the DNB Household Survey (DHS) from the Netherlands between 2002
and 2016. As broadly discussed in the literature, different factors may lead toward marriage
disruption; at the same time, the role played by inherited wealth, as a fundamental driver
in matrimonial strategies, has always represented a very interesting topic. Along this line,
starting from the idea that an inheritance receipt might impact various aspects of an indi-
vidual’s life, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard ratios model and test what variables act
as drivers in enhancing the chances of withdrawing from the marital union. In particular,
we estimate the probability that a married couple divorces and how this probability varies
through time, identified by the duration of the marriage, trying to understand the role of
inheritance/gift receipt, differentiated between inheritances/gifts received by the husband or
the wife, and other covariates that might affect the transition probability. The set of covari-
ates we control for contains, for example, whether the recipient of the inheritance was the
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husband or the wife, several dummies for the educational level of the head of the household,
personal income of both partners, etc. We also include the difference in educational level
between spouses with the aim of capturing the potential importance of bargaining power.
Findings suggest that when the wealth endowment, such as an inheritance or a gift,
has been received by the wife, this enhances the chances that separation of the couple will
occur. This signals that receiving an inheritance/gift changes the bargaining power in the
couple: while for the husband, who probably already was in a predominant position in the
household, it does not represent an incentive to divorce, for the wife, results suggest that
she may perceive a change in the bargaining power that enhances the chances of marital
disruption. We also checked whether the size of the inheritance matters exploiting the
amount of the inheritance/gift received. Results confirm previous findings suggesting that,
when the inheritance or transfer is received by the wife, divorce is more likely to occur.
Presence of child(ren) in the household seems to deter divorce; indeed, it appears to act as
“glue” for the marriage reducing the chances of separation.
Starting from the interesting results pointed out in the previous chapter, the issue arises
that also in different domains, there may be gender differences in money management and
wealth endowment can lead toward an increase of the bargaining power for the “female
counterpart”, probably related to the fact that women are often excluded from the labour
market and are not in a predominant position in the household. Over the years, this situation
has created disadvantages for women, even when they participate in the labour market; along
this line, we will analyze gender differences in the credit market for Italian women- and men-
led firms.
Hence, in Chapter 4, the analysis focuses on the credit access and credit demand of Italian
firms using RIL data, a sample of the Employer and Employee Survey (RIL) conducted by
INAPP (previously ISFOL) in 2015. The RIL is a nationally representative sample of over
24,000 partnership and limited companies, operating in the non-agricultural private sector
in Italy. The RIL contains a rich set of information about personnel organisation, industrial
relations, and other workplace characteristics. With regard to the sample selection, we only
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consider ‘active’ firms, meaning that we exclude wound-up firms or bankrupt firms, with a
final sample of 29,789 observations. This sample allows us to better control for size effects
and check if the opt-out phenomenon is still discernible in large companies when the person
in charge for strategic decision-making is a woman.
We investigate whether the gender of the decision-maker of the firm affects the demand
for credit. Access to credit by women is a crucially debated issue, as women appear to be
more disadvantaged in getting a loan than men, without exhibiting additional riskiness with
respect to the male counterparts, as was recently shown by Alesina et al. (2013) on overdraft
credit to micro-firms and the self-employed in Italy. In the current paper, we investigate
both dimensions, exploiting the information available in the dataset, of asking for a loan
in a given year and being successful in obtaining it - i.e., whether the loan was approved.
We control for the characteristics of the women or men leading the company, looking in
particular at education level and age. We expect the culture-determined reluctance towards
loan application to be negatively correlated to education. As for the age, we expect younger
women to approach bank financing more similarly to men. Finally, we include regional
dummies to capture any local difference in credit offer, macroeconomic environment, and
intensity of gender bias.
Our results, robust to different specifications, show that a gender-detrimental effect is
found at a significant level only for credit demand; in particular, it appears that women-led
firms have two percentage points lower probability of asking for credit than men-led firms.
On the other hand, we find no significant evidence that credit approval is negatively affected
by the gender of the firm manager. Results also hold when we allow for selection in having
asked for credit, which could be responsible for a self-selection channel through which only
good debtors ask for credit.
All chapters of this dissertation are self-contained. They have their own introductions and
appendices (directly reported after each paper). The bibliography containing the references
to all papers can be found at the end of this dissertation.
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2 Subjective Inheritance Expectations and Economic
Outcomes
Joint with Maria Cristina Rossi, and Arthur van Soest
2.1 Introduction
A large strand of literature has focused on the effect of unexpected income receipt and
windfall gains on consumption and saving decisions. The economic rationale, following
the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis (Deaton et al., 2002), suggests that households
should just react to unexpected shocks in income and wealth, while expected shocks are
already incorporated in the optimal consumption and saving pattern. Thus, the timing of
expected income receipt should not matter for consumption decisions. Based on these the-
oretical implications, the empirical literature has considered both expected and unexpected
income/wealth changes to test whether the theoretical implications hold and under what
circumstances (see Borella et al. (2009), Garcia et al. (1997)). Wealth changes and their
impact on consumption choices have been studied in several ways, e.g., with reference to real
estate wealth change (Calcagno et al., 2009) including inheritance receipt and its impact on
labour supply (see Brown et al. (2010)). However, as an inheritance does not come as a
shock for many of the receivers, little is known about expectations on inheritance and their
impact on economic choices.
Inheritance can be conceived as “unearned income” which should affect earnings, con-
sumption, savings, and other economic outcomes (Imbens et al., 2001): Brown et al. (2010)
use inheritance receipt as a wealth shock and find that it is associated with a significant in-
crease in the probability of retirement, especially when the inheritance is unexpected. Along
this line, inheritance, like any other form of unearned income, will likely have an effect on
household decisions such as the amount of time devoted to leisure/work and consumption.
The role of wealth in modelling labour decisions has been broadly considered (see Krueger
& Pischke (1991), Brown et al. (2010), Bloemen & Stancanelli (2001) on early retirement,
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Bloemen & Stancanelli (2001) on labour market participation and Imbens et al. (2001), Hen-
ley (2004) on hours worked); however, subjective expectations on bequests can also act as a
possible engine driving labour market and savings intentions; along this line, an inheritance
might, for example, affect labour supply (Joulfaian & Wilhelm, 1994): indeed, Bloemen &
Stancanelli (2001) found that wealth has a significantly positive impact on the reservation
wage and a negative impact on the employment probability – higher levels of wealth result
in higher reservation wages and higher reservation wages are associated with a lower em-
ployment probability. Recent evidence focuses on the effect of receiving an inheritance on
the Labour Force Participation (LFP) in married couples: bequests might, indeed, act as
trigger in increasing the bargaining power of the recipient affecting his/her LFP, providing
new evidence on the ability of spouses to commit to a fully efficient allocation of resources
within the household (Blau & Goodstein, 2016). Bequests represent a component of wealth:
Joulfaian (2006) finds that wealth increases by only a fraction of the inheritances received,
and implies a marginal propensity to consume significantly higher than that predicted within
the perfect foresight or consumption smoothing frameworks.
In the literature, there have also been many findings on the intention to bequeath: recent
ones discuss different assumptions concerning household preferences and show that these
assumptions have varying implications for bequest motives and bequest division from an
inter-country difference point of view (Horioka, 2014). Concerning the relationship between
actual inheritances and economic decisions, there is some evidence on the effect of receiving
an inheritance on economic behaviour (Brown et al., 2010). Indeed, along this line, another
link to be taken into account is between inheritances and bequests; recent findings suggest
that the experience of inheriting can enhance the intention to bequeath (Stark & Nicinska,
2015).
While the literature on the intention to bequeath is rich, little has been written on
inheritance expectations and current economic behaviour. Horioka et al. (2003) explore the
channel linking bequest expectations and saving behaviour and find a negative effect: The
higher the expectation of leaving a bequest, the lower is the decumulation pace.
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There is also some evidence on the effect of an actual inheritance on economic behaviour,
rather than an expected inheritance (Brown et al., 2010).
Since we are dealing with the literature of the life cycle model, which assumes that
individuals plan their consumption and savings behaviour over the life cycle, we start from
the idea that events that are going to happen in the future should affect current individuals’
lifestyle and behaviour.
The role of expectations has been widely considered in the economic literature, as an
important driver shaping economic and financial decisions. Expectations on a future inheri-
tance could represent an important factor affecting labour outcomes as well as saving choices.
To the best of our knowledge, little evidence still has been found on the possible link be-
tween inheritance expectations and individuals’ economic behaviours. This constitutes one
of the main reasons why this paper aims at studying whether subjective expectations of re-
ceiving an inheritance in the future can, in some way, affect financial decisions. The degree
of uncertainty surrounding the size and timing of the receipt of inheritances may influence
the pattern of life cycle saving (Weil, 1996). Expecting a wealth endowment in the future
(compared to already having received it) should then play a relevant role in shaping the
behaviour of people, particularly if the amount is large. Large inheritances might lead to a
decline both in labour force participation and savings (Joulfaian, 2006).
We contribute to the literature by analysing the relationship between inheritance expec-
tations and different economic outcomes (such as savings). We are interested in how current
financial and working decisions are the consequence of expecting an inheritance in the future.
Indeed, as the title of this work suggests, we are interested in observing different financial
and working decisions that, according to the life cycle model, should be a consequence of
expecting an inheritance in the future: in particular, we focus our attention on savings, the
propensity of bequeathing, and the work versus leisure decision.
We expect that the perspective of receiving a wealth endowment in the future should
positively affect current consumption decisions, should lead individuals to be more willing to
leave a bequest, and might induce them to imagine themselves not to be part of the labour
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force at an age close enough to the standard retirement age. Our empirical methodology will
involve the use of the DNB Household Survey (DHS), a Dutch panel data set collected by
the CentERdata that allows to study both psychological and economic aspects of financial
behaviour. This panel survey was launched in 1993 and comprises information on work,
pensions, housing, mortgages, income, possessions, loans, health, economic and psychological
concepts, and personal characteristics. This data set is particularly suited for our analysis
since it includes many questions about sources of income the respondents may have, it
contains very detailed information on assets, liabilities and mortgages; since we are interested
in questions concerning the probability of receiving an inheritance in the future, we devised
a special module which comprehends questions that enrich the DHS data set with new
information on inheritance expectations.
The direct measurement of expectations has developed since the early 1990s, as expec-
tations are a key interest in intertemporal economic models and measuring expectations
is useful to avoid making strong assumptions (Manski (2002), Manski (2004)); along this
line, the measurement of expectations in terms of probabilities has become very important
in economics. Elicitation of probabilistic expectations has several desirable features, such
as ease of interpretation, ability to characterize uncertainty, possibility of exploiting the
algebra of probability to check the internal consistency of a respondent’s elicited expecta-
tions about different events, and interpersonal comparability allowing to reach conclusions
about the correspondance between subjective beliefs and “frequentist realities” (Dominitz
(1998), Dominitz & Manski (1997), Manski (2004)). Along this line, with the aim of un-
derstanding economic behaviour, validity may be defined by the correspondence between
survey reports of expectations and the actual subjective expectations which determine in-
dividual behaviour; as said in Dominitz (1998), it is unreasonable and unnecessary to hope
for perfect correspondence. Often, in the absence of expectations data, researchers are left
to infer expectations from realizations. Conversely, having at their own disposal individuals’
expectations, De Bresser & van Soest (2015) analyze the determinants of satisfaction with
various dimensions of pension arrangements, emphasizing the role of subjective expectations
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regarding retirement income; their main focus was the validity of subjective expectations
elicited through probabilistic measures and the causal impact of expectations on well-being.
Indeed, analysing the predictive power of expectations can provide insights into the valid-
ity of expectations data; even if it is not possible to verify whether reported probabilities
reflect the actual beliefs held by respondents, it might be possible to assess the internal
consistency and plausibility of responses: evidence suggests that responses have such “face
validity” when the questions concern well-defined events that are relevant to respondents’
lives (Manski (2004)). In doing so, De Bresser & van Soest (2015) apply two different meth-
ods to construct subjective replacement rate distributions from the reported probabilities.
The first, proposed in Dominitz & Manski (1997), fits an assumed underlying (log-normal)
distribution for each observation by minimizing the squared difference between the prob-
abilities implied by the assumed distribution and those reported in the data; the second
approach, adapted from Bellemare et al. (2012), uses spline interpolation to fit a subjective
distribution that passes through the points corresponding to the probabilities reported by
the respondents. The latter is a non-parametric procedure, in the sense that it does not
assume any parametric form of the underlying distribution.
Talking about expectations, it might be relevant to refer to the widespread literature
on survival expectations which can be in some way related to inheritance expectations as
well. Individuals’ expectations about their chances of survival to older ages are a crucial
component in a range of economic decisions such as how to save for retirement and how to
spend savings once retired that are of increasing significance as individuals are given more
responsibility for and control over their retirement provision (O’Dea et al. (2018), O’Donnell
et al. (2008)). Previous research indicates that subjective expectations correlate with back-
ground characteristics in plausible ways (Manski, 2004) and the validity of expectations data
has been established in this way mainly for conceptually straightforward examples such as
individual mortality (van Santen et al., 2012); indeed, younger cohorts and women under-
estimate their chances of a long life more than older cohorts and men (e.g., Hamermesh
(1985); Wenglert & Rosen (2000); Hurd & McGarry (2002); Banks et al. (2004); Gan et
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al. (2005); Elder (2013); O’Donnell et al. (2008); Teppa & Lafourcade (2013); Kutlu-Koc &
Kalwij (2017)).
Possible concerns about endogeneity might arise when considering subjective expecta-
tions, since expectations could be correlated with relevant background variables that are
unobserved to the researcher.
Unlike De Bresser & van Soest (2015), we cannot control for fixed effects to take away a
large part of this concern. We therefore cannot prove that the effect we find is causal. Still,
we think it is plausible that subjective inheritance has a causal impact on individuals’ be-
haviour: indeed, our results show that individuals perceive the expected inheritances as a
potential increase of personal wealth which leads to a reduction in savings; moreover, expec-
tations seem to matter also in the enhancement of the intention to bequeath and in work vs.
leisure choices: indeed, expecting to receive an inheritance increases the chances of leaving
a bequest and reduce chances of working at an age of 62 years old (or higher). Eventually,
results are robust and in line with our expectations, even when dropping individuals who
already benefited of a wealth endowment, i.e., individuals whose propensity of saving might
have already been shaped through previous money transfers.
Information on inheritances and gifts taxation in the Netherlands In the
Netherlands gifts and inheritances are subject to different principles depending also for ex-
ample on the “intergenerational relationship” between the provider of the gift/inheritance
and the recipient. Since we are dealing with inheritance expectations, it might be valuable
to illustrate how the taxation and exemption concerning inheritance and gifts work in the
Netherlands. One of the most glaring aspects which comes to mind when talking about a
donation or an inheritance is related to paying taxes; however, according to the Belastingdi-
enst, the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration, there are some exemptions depending on
the amount of the gift/inheritance and also depending on the relationship with the donor:
for example, in 2016, the maximum amount of a donation from a parent to her son, daughter
or foster child exempts up to about 53,000 euros once in the life of a child; along this line, it
is also possible to make a donation to a child of about 5,300 euros exempt from tax in each
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calendar year. In Appendix 2.7, we report all details concerning exemptions and tax rates
on donations and inheritances.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 describe the
data and the empirical methodology, in Section 2.4 we perform and show some robustness
checks and extension of our analysis, Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Data
The empirical analysis involves the use of the DNB Household Survey (DHS), a Dutch panel
study collected by the CentERdata, a survey agency at Tilburg University1 specialized in
Internet surveys, that allows to study both psychological and economic aspects of financial
behaviour; this panel survey was launched in 1993 and comprises information on work and
pensions, accommodation and mortgages, income and health, assets and liabilities, economic
and psychological concepts. The questionnaires are sent to the respondents via Internet,
the respondents fill in the questionnaires at their home computers, and then answers are
sent back in the same way: this implies that the questionnaires are self-administered and
individuals can answer at the most comfortable time for them. It is important to notice that
the selection of panel members of the survey is not dependent on access to Internet: indeed,
households without a computer or an internet connection are provided with the necessary
equipment.
2.2.1 Inheritance Expectations
The data set is particularly suited for our analysis since it includes many questions about
sources of income assets, liabilities and mortgages the household may have. In addition,
since we were interested in questions concerning the probability of receiving inheritance in
the future period, we devised a special module which comprehends few questions that enrich
the data set with new information on inheritance expectations.
1See https://www.centerdata.nl/en
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This questionnaire was fielded from 25 November to 29 November 2016. The overall
response rate was 83.8% (2,196 out of 2,621 respondents). We merge our module on inher-
itance expectations with the 2016 assets and liabilities questionnaire and the economic and
psychological concepts from DHS.
It is important to say that we allow for continuous responses (i.e., the choice of the chance
of receiving an inheritance) instead of a binary (yes/no) variable; we think that in this way
responses will be more accurate, since individuals are in some way forced to reflect more
deeply on the question. Furthermore, as reported in Manski (2004) if people can express
their expectations in probabilistic form, elicitation of subjective probability distributions
should have compelling advantages relative to verbal questioning. Probability provides a
well-defined absolute numerical scale for responses; hence, there is reason to think that
responses may be also interpersonally comparable.
The wording of the four subjective probability questions on the inheritance is given below.
Questions from the module on inheritance expectations
Q1. How likely is it that you will receive an inheritance in the next 10 years? [if Q1 > 0
then go to Q2 ]
Q2. And how likely is that you will receive an inheritance of more than 10,000 euros in
the next 10 years? [if Q2 > 0 then go to Q3.]
Q3. And how likely is that you will receive an inheritance of more than 25,000 euros in
the next 10 years? [if Q3 > 0 then go to Q4.]
Q4. And how likely is that you will receive an inheritance of more than 50,000 euros in
the next 10 years?
Fill a percentage here from 0 to 100 percent. For example, if you are certain that you
will receive an inheritance in the next 10 years, then enter 100%. But if there is still a small
chance that you will not receive it, then you enter 97% or less. If you are fully convinced that
you will receive no inheritance in the next 10 years, enter 0%. But if there is still a small
chance that you will receive it, then you enter for example 3 percent or something more. And
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if you think the odds are about half, then you fill in 50%, or slightly more or less if that fits
better with what you think.
In principle, question Q2 is asked only if the answer to question Q1 is positive, and the
same logic applies to the subsequent questions (Q3 and Q4). The following figures (Fig.2.1a
- Fig.2.1d) present the distributions of the subjective inheritance expectations. About half
of the respondents report a zero probability of receiving any inheritance. As often with
subjective probability questions, there is some bunching at 50% and at other round numbers
(10%, 20%, etc.) but this does not seem to be excessive. Kleinjans & van Soest (2014) show
that these features do not affect the determinants of (retirement) expectations.
Among those who report a non-zero probability of receiving an inheritance, a large minor-
ity is certain that the amount will be lower than e10,000 (Figure 2.1b). Similarly, many
respondents indicate that their inheritance will always be lower than e25,000 or e50,000.
Figure 2.1: Subjective inheritance expectations in 10 years
(a) Expected Inheritance (b) Expected Inheritance greater than 10,000e
(c) Expected Inheritance greater than 25,000e (d) Expected Inheritance greater than 50,000e
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Are the Expectations Responses Coherent?
Willingness to answer the questions does not necessarily imply that the responses are mean-
ingful; indeed, one possible problem with this probabilistic approach in submitting these
questions might be related to “anchoring” problems, implying that respondents’ beliefs are
influenced by the wording, order, and context of the questions (Morgan et al., 1992). Sup-
pose, for example, that a respondent expects her/his chances of receiving an inheritance
greater than 50,000 euros; then, by firstly asking the probability of receiving an inheritance
greater than e10,000, the respondent may be influenced to think that this amount is ob-
jectively reasonable and may therefore report a higher probability than believed a priori
(Dominitz & Manski, 1997). At this point, it seems useful to attempt to understand if
respondents report their expectations coherently.
Response Rates and Consistency of Probabilities The special module on inheri-
tance expectations has been submitted to 2,621 household members from the CentER panel:
among those, 421 individuals do not answer to the questionnaire, 2,196 complete it, and
4 respondents start but do not complete the survey. The overall response rate is 83,8%.
Analysing the obtained answers, it is interesting to report that 992 individuals report to
have zero chances of receiving an inheritance, 271 have no chance of receiving an inheritance
greater than e10,000, 172 have zero chance of an inheritance greater than e25,000 and 166
report a zero probability of getting an inheritance greater than e50,000.
According to the literature, two common fears are generally associated with probabilistic
questions, namely, non-response and focal points (e.g., answering 0 percent, 50 percent, or
100 percent). Kleinjans & van Soest (2014) show that these features do not affect the deter-
minants of (retirement) expectations but that individuals round off probabilities instead.
Going through the reported probabilities, it is interesting to notice that 197 members report
the same probability values at all four questions about chances of receiving inheritances:
among those, 175 individuals report the same probability value different from 0 or 100 per-
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Table 2.1: Response Rates
Number of Respondents Response Rate (%)
Expected inheritance 2,196 83.78
Expected inheritance > 10k 1,205 45.97
Expected inheritance > 25k 934 35.63
Expected inheritance > 50k 761 29.03
The number of respondents report individuals who answer the module we submitted; the re-
sponse rate is computed on the whole sample to whom the module has been handed in (2,621
individuals).
cent chance; there are 45 cases in which individuals always report a probability of 50 percent
and 22 cases in which the probability of receiving an inheritance for all four cases is always
100 percent2.
Another check is considering whether the reported probabilities obey the logical rule that
they should be non-increasing: our data show that the rate of inconsistency is very low,
around 2% out of the whole sample; to be more precise, just 46 individuals out of the 2,196
who answer our questionnaire report non-increasing probabilities.
Along this line, it can be possible to assess the internal consistency and plausibility of
responses. So, next step concerns the validity of subjective expectations elicited through the
probabilistic measures and the causal impact of expectations on well-being; focusing on the
predictive power of expectations can provide consistency of the probabilistic measures and
give insights into the validity of expectations data.
To do so, we follow the approach proposed by De Bresser & van Soest (2015) who per-
form two different methods to build subjective distributions from reported probabilities: the
parametric one proposed in Dominitz & Manski (1997) and the non-parametric approach of
Bellemare et al. (2012); in Appendix 2.8, we show the implementation details and descriptive
statistics for the parametric approach comparing them with the reported probabilities of our
survey.
2 For all these cases, we run again the regressions dropping these observations; results stay the same
except the probability of receiving an inheritance greater than e25,000. Moreover, simply excluding these
observations when analyzing the determinants of the subjective replacement rate or subjective uncertainty
as is commonly done in other papers (Dominitz & Manski, 2006), can therefore result in endogenous sample
selection and bias the parameter estimates (van Santen et al., 2012).
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Descriptive Evidence on Inheritance Expectations Data
Here, we report how the chances of receiving an inheritance look like among different age
categories; it appears that among people between 45 and 54 years old the probabilities
of receiving an inheritance in the next years are higher compared to the other categories;
this evidence seems reasonable since individuals in that age category, identifying those with
older (grand)parents, could represent the ones with more “solid” and relatively well formed
inheritance expectations.
Table 2.2: Mean chances of receiving an inheritance by age categories
Age categories Chances bequest Chances inh> 10k Chances inh> 25k Chances inh> 50k
16-34 years 22.93 13.48 12.35 10.56
35-44 years 31.46 24.00 19.55 16.22
45-54 years 38.57 37.48 32.21 25.34
55 years and older 14.31 26.33 26.74 24.89
Total 21.72 25.48 23.22 19.65
The table reports the means of chances of receiving an inheritance in all four cases. Statistics are weighted by sample weights.
At this point of the analysis, it seems interesting to understand what the determinants
of the probabilities of receiving an inheritance are. We therefore perform a Tobit regression
explaining each of the inheritance probabilities, with left censoring of zero values. The
possible determinants we consider are individual socio-demographics such as gender, age,
educational level, income and wealth3 measures (the latter two in logarithmic form); the
results are presented in Table 2.3. Female has a negative but insignificant effect, education
appears to matter (low educated have low expectations compared to those with university
education, which is the reference category). Wealth has a positive impact on inheritance
expectations; furthermore, focusing on the bottom part of Table 2.3, it is interesting to notice
that being retired has a negative impact on inheritance expectations, as well as declaring not
to have received allowances during childhood or adolescence; it seems plausible that people
less used to dealing with financial concepts have lower inheritance expectations.
3 Net worth computed taking into account all types of private savings and investment accounts, housing
wealth, other real estate and durable goods net of mortgages and other financial debt.
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Moreover, we analyze the possible correlation with self-reported survival expectations
and self-reported health information4 and we see that there is a weak and negative correla-
tion between inheritance expectation and health status (individuals who state to have poor
levels of health have lower inheritance expectations). Individuals who have lower survival
expectations5 also appear to have lower inheritance expectations.
Our analysis focuses on the effect of probability of receiving an inheritance on savings; it
should be emphasized that consumption cannot be estimated since in the DHS dataset there
is no information concerning consumption; thus, next section focuses on the construction of
the main variable reporting savings.
2.2.2 Savings Measure
In order to construct a reliable measure for savings, we try to combine the traditional ap-
proach in the literature (i.e., approximating savings as the difference between financial assets
across years) and a different approach proposed by Alessie & Teppa (2010) in which they
exploit different questions concerning saving behaviours and expenditures habits present in
the DHS dataset. In constructing the delta in financial assets between 2015 and 2016, we
have used information about wealth; we took the most liquid assets (checking accounts,
savings or deposit accounts, deposit books, savings certificates, savings arrangements) and
subtracted the most liquid liabilities (private loans, extended lines of credit).
4 “In general, would you say your health is: 1 excellent, 2 good, 3 fair, 4 not so good, 5 poor”.
5 In the DHS, there are some questions concerning life-expectancy and are to be answered by respondents
under the age of 90. In particular, we focus our attention on three of them:
• How likely is it that you will attain at least the age of 65? (KANS0)
• How likely is it that you will attain at least the age of 75? (KANS1a)
• How likely is it that you will attain at least the age of 80? (KANS2a)
KANS0 is presented to people aged 16 thru 55, KANS1a is presented to people aged 16 thru 65, KANS2a is
presented to people aged 16 thru 70.
For all cases, respondents have to indicate her/his answer on a scale of 0 thru 10, where 0 means “no chance
at all” and 10 means “absolutely certain”.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Subjective Inheritance Expectations
Chances inherit Chances inherit Chances inherit Chances inherit
>10k >25k >50k
Female -0.0280 -0.0644 -0.0206 -0.0163
(0.0384) (0.0403) (0.0417) (0.0453)
Age -0.0048*** -0.0028 -0.0020 -0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Income(log) 0.1049*** 0.0794*** 0.0833*** 0.0697**
(0.0263) (0.0275) (0.0292) (0.0315)
Wealth(log) 0.0063 0.0099* 0.0120** 0.0127**
(0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0060)
Educational Levels
Primary -0.1006 -0.2259 -0.1661 -0.1903
(0.1242) (0.1372) (0.1407) (0.1586)
Lower Vocational -0.1401** -0.1990*** -0.2511*** -0.2928***
(0.0587) (0.0617) (0.0654) (0.0745)
Intermediate General 0.0503 -0.0399 -0.0474 -0.0264
(0.0693) (0.0724) (0.0751) (0.0800)
Intermediate Vocational -0.0264 -0.0371 -0.0615 -0.0722
(0.0530) (0.0541) (0.0555) (0.0598)
Higher Vocational -0.0710 -0.1298** -0.1107** -0.1077*
(0.0497) (0.0511) (0.0520) (0.0561)
Retired -0.2805*** -0.2842*** -0.2786*** -0.2928***
(0.0519) (0.0557) (0.0589) (0.0663)
Single -0.0894** -0.1230*** -0.1234** -0.1207**
(0.0442) (0.0470) (0.0486) (0.0532)
Child(ren) -0.0340 -0.1047* -0.0987* -0.1011
(0.0540) (0.0566) (0.0579) (0.0631)
No Money Support to Child -0.0481 -0.0077 -0.0482 -0.0513
(0.0454) (0.0480) (0.0497) (0.0547)
No Allowance as Child -0.0665* -0.1671*** -0.1665*** -0.1877***
(0.0393) (0.0424) (0.0448) (0.0504)
No SaveTeach as Child -0.1176** -0.0597 -0.0371 -0.0338
(0.0499) (0.0530) (0.0555) (0.0619)
Left-censored Observations 426 552 620 702
Uncensored Observations 537 411 343 261
Observations 963 963 963 963
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Hence, following the Alessie & Teppa (2010) way of dealing with the proxy for savings,
we firstly use the information about whether any money has been put aside in the previous
12 months; in the case in which there is an assertive answer, individuals are asked to report
the amount saved in the same period. Therefore, for those who stated to put aside money, if
the change in financial wealth corresponds to the class of money put aside then savings are
set equal to the change in the financial wealth; in the opposite case, if the change in financial
wealth does not correspond to the class of money put aside then savings are set equal to the
midpoints6 for each class of the variable reporting the amount of money put aside.
Table 2.4: Did your household put any money aside in the past 12 months?
Freq. Percent Cum.
Yes 1,476 70.35 70.35
No 622 29.65 100.00
Total 2,098 100.00
Secondly, for those who declare to not having put any money aside, we cross this infor-
mation with another question present in the survey, i.e., “Over the past 12 months, would
you say the expenditures of your household were higher than the income of the household,
about equal to the income of the household, or lower than the income of the household?”.
Table 2.5: Expenditure trends over the past 12 months
Freq. Percent Cum.
Higher than the hh income 332 15.82 15.82
Almost equal to the hh income 969 46.19 62.01
Lower than the hh income 797 37.99 100.00
Total 2,098 100.00
So, for those who asserted to have put no money aside and whose expenditures were
equal to the income of the household, we set zero as the amount of savings (meaning that
they did not save as well as not dissaved); for those who claimed to have put no money
6 Following the approach proposed in the paper by Alessie & Teppa (2010), since respondents report the
amount of money put aside in classes, we constructed the variable by taking the midpoints for each class.
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aside and whose expenditures were higher than the income of the household, we set the
(negative) delta of financial wealth signalling that they dissaved; eventually, for those who
claimed to have put no money aside but whose expenditures were lower than the income
of the household, we set the (positive) delta of financial wealth (meaning that they saved).
Figure 2.2 reports the distribution of the savings variable we constructed.
Figure 2.2: Savings Distribution
2.3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical strategy focuses on the effect of probability of receiving an inheritance on
savings:
Yi = α + β ∗ prob inhi∗ + γ ∗Xi + εi
where Yi, our dependent variable, identifies the savings while Xi collects all demographic
and socio-economic control variables such as gender, age, income, level of education, etc
partially presented in Section 2.2. It should be emphasized that in the control variables we
∗ This variable identifies four different cases:
- Chances of receiving an inheritance in next ten years
- Chances of receiving an inheritance greater than e10,000 in next ten years
- Chances of receiving an inheritance greater than e25,000 in next ten years
- Chances of receiving an inheritance greater than e50,000 in next ten years
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also include three controls which capture personal characteristics, which might in some way
shape individuals’ saving behaviour, such as for example not planning to give large amounts
of money to child(ren) or other information concerning attitudes towards lack of receiving
allowances or teaching of putting money away as child(ren).
2.3.1 Probit Estimation
At this point, to understand whether inheritance expectations increases/decreases chances
of saving or not, we built the dependent variable of our model, i.e., the variable reporting
savings7, as a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if savings are positive and 0 otherwise.
Results from Probit model are presented in Table 2.6: the sign of the coefficients related
to the probability of receiving an inheritance leads toward the direction that we expected;
moreover, coefficients related to inheritance expectations appear to have a negative and
statistically significant impact on probability of saving: in particular, they range from 9 to
around 13 percentage points decrease in saving. It is worth noticing that there seems to be
a gender effect suggesting that women have around 5 percentage points higher probability of
saving than men, signalling that women tend to save more compared to men: this might be
due to the more conservative and less-risky attitudes of female individuals which can lead
toward saving. Along this line, Seguino & Floro (2003) argue that increases in women’s
wages as well as increases in their share of income lead to higher rates of aggregate saving;
this can be due to the different propensities to save probably related to variations in external
factors that affect saving behaviours. Concerning the variable about the single status, which
identifies a one component household without children, it can make sense to think that
a single might lean to dissave compared to someone that lives with a partner/spouse or
someone with children. Another interesting result is related to the variable reporting the
intention of giving money support to child(ren): it appears that those who do not intend to
7 Using the savings variable in its original form and running an OLS regression, results show a negative
but insignificant relationship between the main variables of interest. We also create an indicator variable
on the basis of the qualitative questions present in the survey (to be more precise, an indicator variable
which takes value of 1 whether the individuals states to have put money aside in the past or whether the
individuals states to have had lower expenditures in the past): also in this case, results suggest a negative
effect on the propensity toward saving but coefficients are not statistically significant.
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give support to their own children have around 7 percentage points lower probability than
those who are willing to financially support child(ren) suggesting that they tend to spend
more (maybe for themselves) and, as a consequence, save less. Moreover, there is a negative
effect due to the fact of not having being taught as child toward putting some money away
(i.e., saving).
2.3.2 Ordered Probit Estimation
Eventually, exploiting the possibility of differentiating between those who dissave, neither
dissave or save, and those who save, we construct our dependent variable reporting savings
in the household as a three categories variable8.
Table 2.7: New specification of dependent variable reporting saving behaviour
Saving, no savings or dissaving Mean savings Frequency in percentage values
Dissave -9937.85 9.78
Neither save or dissave 0 18.96
Save 6137.39 71.26
Total 3401.20 100.00
The table reports the new specification of dependent variable reporting saving behaviour. Statistics
are weighted by sample weights.
Results with Ordered Probit confirm once again the negative sign obtained both with
the previous specification (see Tables 2.8 and 2.9). Coefficients related to inheritance ex-
pectations are statistically significant. In general, all results lead toward the same direction
across the different models and specification; it might be worth focusing on the income ef-
fect: results seem to be in line with the literature stating that propensity to save and to
consume differ substantially across income groups and that high-income households save a
greater fraction of income than low-income households (Dynan et al. (2004), Fan (2006) and
Huggett & Ventura (2000)).
8 This variable takes value 1 if savings are below zero (dissaving), value 2 if savings are exactly equal
to zero, value 3 if savings are greater than zero (saving).
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Probability Inheritance 10k -0.1266∗∗∗
(0.0422)
Probability Inheritance 25k -0.0912∗
(0.0481)
Probability Inheritance 50k -0.1105∗∗
(0.0550)
Female 0.0481∗ 0.0490∗∗ 0.0505∗∗ 0.0507∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0246)
Age -0.0041∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Income(log) 0.0508∗∗∗ 0.0492∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.0476∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0133)
Educational Levels
Primary -0.0202 -0.0259 -0.0168 -0.0168
(0.0718) (0.0726) (0.0707) (0.0707)
Lower Vocational -0.0478 -0.0529 -0.0474 -0.0472
(0.0438) (0.0439) (0.0436) (0.0437)
Intermediate General -0.0152 -0.0208 -0.0174 -0.0175
(0.0491) (0.0496) (0.0493) (0.0494)
Intermediate Vocational -0.0402 -0.0435 -0.0416 -0.0424
(0.0430) (0.0432) (0.0431) (0.0432)
Higher Vocational -0.0651 -0.0698∗ -0.0640 -0.0639
(0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0416) (0.0417)
Retired 0.0181 0.0181 0.0242 0.0250
(0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0303) (0.0303)
Single -0.0860∗∗∗ -0.0860∗∗ -0.0833∗∗ -0.0829∗∗
(0.0332) (0.0334) (0.0333) (0.0333)
Child(ren) 0.0304 0.0320 0.0335 0.0334
(0.0406) (0.0409) (0.0411) (0.0411)
No Money Support to Child -0.0710∗∗ -0.0725∗∗ -0.0728∗∗ -0.0724∗∗
(0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0312)
No Allowance as Child -0.0203 -0.0247 -0.0208 -0.0206
(0.0253) (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0254)
No SaveTeach as Child -0.0765∗∗ -0.0733∗∗ -0.0724∗∗ -0.0716∗∗
(0.0351) (0.0349) (0.0348) (0.0348)
Observations 1250 1250 1250 1250
Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9 reports the marginal effects considering as outcome the three different cases which
we specified at the beginning of this section (i.e., dissaving, neither saving or dissaving, and
saving). Since coefficients appear to be in line with the previous specification and exploiting
the possibility of differentiating between the different three categories by which we construct
the new dependent variable, in Table 2.9, we report the marginal effects of inheritance ex-
pectations: it is interesting to notice for example that an increase in probability of receiving
an inheritance lead to a 5 percentage points higher probability of dissaving.
In the analysis so far we included one of the four subjective inheritance probabilities
at the time as an explanatory variable. Including all four of them at the same time gives
imprecise and insignificant estimates, due to multicollinearity (results not presented). In-
stead, following Dominitz & Manski (1997), we used the four probabilities to estimate each
respondent’s complete subjective distribution and used the mean and variance of this distri-
bution as regressors. See Appendix 2.8 for details. The results are presented in Table 2.10.
They are again in line with the previous ones, showing a negative and statistically significant
relationship between mean individual probabilities and propensity toward saving. We find
no significant effect of the subjective variance.
2.4 Robustness Check and Extensions of the Analysis
2.4.1 Money Transfer during Lifetime Could Shape Individuals’ Behaviour?
As discussed in the introduction of this work, in the Netherlands gifts and inheritances are
subject to different principles depending also for example on the “intergenerational relation-
ship” between the provider of the gift/inheritance and the recipient. Just as reminder, gifts
to children are exempt up to an amount of e5,304 (for 2016) per annum; gifts to other
parties are exempt up to an amount of e2,122 (for 2016) per annum. As a consequence,
it is reasonable to suppose that individuals might have already received gifts/inheritance
during their lives. This fact could cause two effects: first of all, individuals are in some way
“prepared” to the concept of receiving a gift or an inheritance at some point of their life;
secondly, the propensity of saving might be shaped through these money transfers.
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Table 2.8: Impact of Inheritance Expectations on Saving - Ordered Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: Probability of Saving
Probability Inheritance -0.3756∗∗∗
(0.1250)
Probability Inheritance 10k -0.4736∗∗∗
(0.1540)
Probability Inheritance 25k -0.3662∗∗
(0.1776)
Probability Inheritance 50k -0.4013∗∗
(0.2006)
Female 0.1379 0.1406 0.1458 0.1458
(0.0919) (0.0922) (0.0917) (0.0917)
Age -0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0154∗∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Income(log) 0.1514∗∗∗ 0.1463∗∗∗ 0.1418∗∗∗ 0.1394∗∗∗
(0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0414) (0.0414)
Educational Levels
Primary -0.1132 -0.1372 -0.1054 -0.1028
(0.2502) (0.2493) (0.2477) (0.2478)
Lower Vocational -0.1559 -0.1772 -0.1591 -0.1553
(0.1471) (0.1466) (0.1454) (0.1462)
Intermediate General -0.0732 -0.0951 -0.0827 -0.0830
(0.1739) (0.1735) (0.1731) (0.1734)
Intermediate Vocational -0.1590 -0.1737 -0.1680 -0.1687
(0.1484) (0.1482) (0.1477) (0.1481)
Higher Vocational -0.2362∗ -0.2559∗ -0.2356∗ -0.2338∗
(0.1401) (0.1398) (0.1388) (0.1394)
Retired 0.1339 0.1272 0.1471 0.1534
(0.1155) (0.1162) (0.1151) (0.1150)
Single -0.2423∗∗ -0.2444∗∗ -0.2360∗∗ -0.2327∗∗
(0.1047) (0.1052) (0.1049) (0.1045)
Child(ren) 0.1312 0.1365 0.1415 0.1423
(0.1429) (0.1436) (0.1435) (0.1432)
No Money Support to Child -0.2808∗∗ -0.2868∗∗ -0.2874∗∗ -0.2853∗∗
(0.1165) (0.1170) (0.1170) (0.1164)
No Allowance as Child -0.1062 -0.1243 -0.1103 -0.1080
(0.0901) (0.0903) (0.0901) (0.0900)
No SaveTeach as Child -0.2280∗∗ -0.2210∗∗ -0.2177∗∗ -0.2145∗∗
(0.1060) (0.1058) (0.1056) (0.1055)
Observations 1250 1250 1250 1250
Coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Probability Inheritance 10k 0.0582∗∗∗
(0.0193)
Probability Inheritance 25k 0.0454∗∗
(0.0223)
Probability Inheritance 50k 0.0498∗∗
(0.0251)
Outcome Variable: Neither Saving or Dissaving
Probability Inheritance 0.0537∗∗∗
(0.0183)
Probability Inheritance 10k 0.0679∗∗∗
(0.0225)
Probability Inheritance 25k 0.0524∗∗
(0.0255)





Probability Inheritance 10k -0.1260∗∗∗
(0.0409)
Probability Inheritance 25k -0.0978∗∗
(0.0474)
Probability Inheritance 50k -0.1072∗∗
(0.0535)
Observations 1250 1250 1250 1250
Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Impact of Mean and Variance of Inheritance Expectations on Saving
Dependent Variable: Probability of Saving
Mean Subjective Expectations -0.1266∗∗
(0.0547)

























No Money Support to Child -0.0702∗∗
(0.0311)
No Allowance as Child -0.0219
(0.0255)
No SaveTeach as Child -0.0762∗∗
(0.0351)
Observations 1250
Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In order to analyze, whether the results might be in some way driven by those who
already received an inheritance or a gift, we conduct a robustness check dropping those
who already benefited of a wealth endowment. To do so, the model of reference is the
same (i.e., our dependent variable is the three-categories variable reporting savings and
the main regressors are the same as before). Table 2.11 shows results from Probit model
without individuals who benefited from a wealth endowment in the previous year: signs and
statistical significance of the coefficients related to inheritance expectations are confirmed;
marginal effects of inheritance expectations appear to be a little bit higher than results
obtained without dropping those who already received an inheritance.
It might be interesting to notice the effect related to the variables capturing personal
characteristics such as not planning to give large amounts of money to child(ren) or not being
taught to save during childhood: it seems that individuals who did not receive any teaching
in saving money or (almost) never receive an allowance as child show higher probabilities of
dissaving compared to the excluded categories who experienced that type of practice.
2.4.2 Extensions of the Analysis
As anticipated in the introduction of this work, the analysis conducted so far aims at con-
tributing to the understanding of the dynamics of wealth distribution, intergenerational
transmission of income and wealth dispersion. Along this line, what we want to do in this
section is considering other economic outcomes, different from savings, which should be af-
fected as well by the formation of positive inheritance expectations in the future: a first
link that is worth to be considered is the one between inheritances (specifically expected
inheritances) and bequests; thereafter, we will also take into account the effect on the choice
of work versus leisure.
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Probability Inheritance 10k -0.1345∗∗∗
(0.0461)
Probability Inheritance 25k -0.0955∗
(0.0527)
Probability Inheritance 50k -0.1129∗
(0.0614)
Female 0.0456∗ 0.0465∗ 0.0477∗ 0.0475∗
(0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0257)
Age -0.0040∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Income(log) 0.0480∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0445∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Educational Levels
Primary -0.0326 -0.0370 -0.0270 -0.0268
(0.0772) (0.0776) (0.0756) (0.0755)
Lower Vocational -0.0632 -0.0675 -0.0611 -0.0606
(0.0471) (0.0472) (0.0468) (0.0468)
Intermediate General -0.0329 -0.0389 -0.0348 -0.0354
(0.0540) (0.0546) (0.0542) (0.0543)
Intermediate Vocational -0.0463 -0.0503 -0.0477 -0.0477
(0.0460) (0.0463) (0.0462) (0.0462)
Higher Vocational -0.0770∗ -0.0813∗ -0.0744∗ -0.0742∗
(0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0447) (0.0447)
Retired 0.0169 0.0185 0.0247 0.0258
(0.0322) (0.0320) (0.0318) (0.0317)
Single -0.0891∗∗∗ -0.0889∗∗ -0.0858∗∗ -0.0849∗∗
(0.0345) (0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0345)
Child(ren) 0.0274 0.0307 0.0322 0.0315
(0.0424) (0.0428) (0.0430) (0.0430)
No Money Support to Child -0.0642∗∗ -0.0663∗∗ -0.0667∗∗ -0.0659∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0327) (0.0326)
No Allowance as Child -0.0201 -0.0248 -0.0204 -0.0205
(0.0264) (0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0265)
No SaveTeach as Child -0.0786∗∗ -0.0751∗∗ -0.0749∗∗ -0.0741∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0357)
Observations 1183 1183 1183 1183
Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Can Expecting an Inheritance Have an Impact on Individuals’ Willingness to
Leave Bequests?
As reported in the work by Stark & Nicinska (2015), it is reasonable to expect that the
receipt of an inheritance will create an environment that is conducive to making bequests,
such that bequeathing will correlate positively with inheriting. However, the argument could
also run in the opposite direction: people who did not receive an inheritance and who found
it difficult to get on in life without the support provided by an inheritance will not want
their children to be subjected to a similar experience, assuming, of course, that people are
altruistic towards their children.
The experience of inheriting can enhance the intention to bequeath (Stark & Nicinska
(2015)); in the same way, also expectation of inheriting can have a positive impact on the
intention to bequeath. For this reason, we exploit the question reporting the chances of
leaving an inheritance as new dependent variable of our model. In order to see if there is
effectively a relationship between expecting an inheritance and being inclined to bequeath,
we consider, as done in the previous specifications, as main explanatory variables of interest
our four probabilities of receiving an inheritance.
Results, reported in Table 2.12, suggest that expecting to receive an inheritance might
increase the chances of leaving a bequest: in particular, an increase in the probability of
receiving an inheritance lead to around 13-15 percentage points increase in the willingness
to bequeath; other interesting results come to light from this analysis: income plays a role,
indeed it is reasonable to imagine that rich households might be the one who are going to
perform a higher chances of leaving a bequest to their relatives; another noticeable result
comes from being a single household, indeed being alone in the household might imply lower
probabilities of bequeathing to someone. Of course, when analysing these results, it has to
be taken into account that willingness to bequeath can be related to unobservable family
norms about bequest which also affect inheritance expectations. Indeed, Wilhelm (1996)
assumes that parents suffer from a fixed psychic cost if they deviate from equal division
of post mortem bequests, while Laitner (1997) writes that social norms may explain why
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intergenerational transfers are equally divided between siblings; in families where parents
think leaving an inheritance is the norm, children could think the same. In such families,
parents will more often leave a bequest, and children will expect to do the same.
Can Expecting an Inheritance Have an Impact on Working at 62 years old?
The effect of wealth on labour market behaviour has been broadly considered in the literature
(Doorley & Pestel, 2016); wealth endowment might model labour decisions (see Krueger &
Pischke (1991), Brown et al. (2010), Bloemen & Stancanelli (2001) on early retirement, Bloe-
men & Stancanelli (2001) on labour market participation and Imbens et al. (2001), Henley
(2004) on hours worked). Inheritance, like any other asset, might, for example, affect labour
supply (Joulfaian & Wilhelm, 1994): indeed, Bloemen & Stancanelli (2001) found wealth to
have a significantly positive impact on the reservation wage and a negative impact on the
employment probability. Therefore, individual’s labour market behaviour may be expected
to react to a wealth shock: along this line, inheritance will likely have an effect on household
decisions such as the amount of time devoted to leisure/work and consumption. Also, wage
expectations, for example, influence occupational and intertemporal labour supply decisions
as well as consumption and savings decisions: indeed, Dominitz (1998) analyzes the cross-
sectional variation in expectations, revisions of expectations between the spring and the fall
of 1993, and the relationship between 1993 expectations and the distribution of spring 1994
earnings realizations. Thence, it seems reasonable to think that expecting an inheritance
might also shape choices related to labour decisions as well as saving choices. So, exploiting
the question reporting the chances of working at an age greater or equal to 62 years old and
using it as dependent variable of this model, we run a last regression (results are reported in
Table 2.13) considering as main explanatory variables inheritance expectations: coefficients
are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the chances of working at an age
of 62 years old or higher for people who expect an inheritance receiving are lower compared
to those who do not have positive inheritance expectations; an interesting result worthy of a
specific attention is for example the one gender specific: women seem to show lower chances
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of working and this can be related to the low female labour market participation.
2.5 Final Remarks
In this paper we investigate whether and to what extent expecting an inheritance acts as
driver in economic choices; in particular, we focus on the effect on savings and on the
intention to bequeath. In doing so, we use a Dutch dataset integrated with a specific module
that we designed on reporting subjective probabilities on receiving an inheritance and the
relative amount (in intervals) in the next ten years.
Results show that individuals perceive the expected inheritances as a potential increase
of personal wealth which leads to a reduction in savings; moreover, expectations seem to
matter also in the enhancement of the intention to bequeath: indeed, expecting to receive an
inheritance increases the chances of leaving a bequest. Eventually, considering the fact that
money transfers during an individual’s lifetime might shape her behaviour, we drop those who
already benefited of a wealth endowment: even without those observations, results are robust
and in line with our expectations. We are aware that this work has several limitations that
should be kept in mind when considering the results: there might be problems of endogeneity
which might be related to unobservable features of parents (e.g., propensity to save, health
status, age, economic situation, etc.) that might shape inheritance expectations; however, we
contribute to the literature by proposing a new source of analysing the relationship between
bequests and savings. Future research is needed to deeply study this link and maybe extend
it taking into account other financial aspects such as debts, equity, investments, etc.
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Table 2.12: Impact of Inheritance Expectations on Intention to Bequeath
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Bequeath
Probability Inheritance 0.129∗∗∗
(0.029)
Probability Inheritance 10k 0.135∗∗∗
(0.035)
Probability Inheritance 25k 0.160∗∗∗
(0.039)
Probability Inheritance 50k 0.154∗∗∗
(0.045)
Female 0.0055 0.0046 0.0019 0.0022
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Age -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income(log) 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0467∗∗∗ 0.0467∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Educational Levels
Primary 0.127∗ 0.128∗ 0.126∗ 0.125∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Lower Vocational 0.0342 0.0329 0.0357 0.0335
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Intermediate Vocational 0.0016 -0.0012 0.0026 0.0031
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Higher Vocational 0.0887∗∗ 0.0870∗∗ 0.0872∗∗ 0.0869∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
University 0.138∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Retired 0.176∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Single -0.0747∗∗∗ -0.0745∗∗∗ -0.0735∗∗∗ -0.0758∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Child(ren) 0.165∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
No Money Support to Child -0.193∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
No Allowance as Child -0.0055 -0.0019 -0.0027 -0.0042
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
No SaveTeach as Child -0.0993∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 1250 1250 1250 1250
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.13: Impact of Inheritance Expectations on Probability of Working
Dependent Variable: Probability of Working
Probability Inheritance -0.0699
(0.051)
Probability Inheritance 10k -0.0737
(0.058)
Probability Inheritance 25k -0.155∗∗
(0.061)
Probability Inheritance 50k -0.187∗∗∗
(0.069)
Female -0.278∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age -0.0068∗∗∗ -0.0067∗∗∗ -0.0064∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income(log) 0.0595∗∗ 0.0594∗∗ 0.0610∗∗ 0.0608∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Educational Levels
Primary -0.336∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
Lower Vocational 0.0184 0.0209 0.0112 0.0128
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
Intermediate Vocational -0.0562 -0.0536 -0.0584 -0.0626
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Higher Vocational 0.0025 0.0035 -0.0004 -0.0037
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
University -0.0188 -0.0155 -0.0178 -0.0220
(0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Retired -0.464∗∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ -0.450∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.086) (0.084) (0.083)
Single -0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0078 -0.0063
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Child(ren) 0.0263 0.0242 0.0218 0.0207
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
No Money Support to Child 0.0119 0.0127 0.0119 0.0161
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
No Allowance as Child -0.0754∗ -0.0783∗ -0.0833∗ -0.0843∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
No SaveTeach as Child 0.0377 0.0414 0.0355 0.0400
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Observations 535 535 535 535
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.6 Appendix A
2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics from Regressions Sample
Table 2.14: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Median Min Max N
Probability Inheritance 0.22 0.32 0.03 0 1 1250
Probability Inheritance 10k 0.14 0.26 0.00 0 1 1250
Probability Inheritance 25k 0.10 0.23 0.00 0 1 1250
Probability Inheritance 50k 0.07 0.19 0.00 0 1 1250
Savings 0.80 0.40 1.00 0 1 1250
Female 0.44 0.50 0.00 0 1 1250
Age 56.49 16.07 60.00 16 91 1250
Income 26591.00 21570.76 23925.32 40 402384 1250
Income(log) 9.92 0.90 10.08 4 13 1250
Wealth 165501.23 204792.34 109420.00 0 2972540 963
Wealth(log) 10.26 3.58 11.60 0 15 963
Retired 0.34 0.47 0.00 0 1 1250
Primary Education 0.03 0.18 0.00 0 1 1250
Lower Vocational Education 0.23 0.42 0.00 0 1 1250
Intermediate General Education 0.10 0.30 0.00 0 1 1250
Intermediate Vocational Education 0.21 0.41 0.00 0 1 1250
Higher Vocational Education 0.27 0.44 0.00 0 1 1250
University Education 0.15 0.36 0.00 0 1 1250
Single 0.22 0.42 0.00 0 1 1250
Child(ren) 0.72 0.45 1.00 0 1 1250
Leave Inheritance 0.59 0.35 0.70 0 1 1250
Probability Working 62 years old 0.56 0.40 0.70 0 1 535
No Money Support to Child 0.53 0.50 1.00 0 1 1250
No Allowance as Child 0.32 0.47 0.00 0 1 1250
No SaveTeach as Child 0.15 0.36 0.00 0 1 1250
40
Table 2.15: Description of the Variables
Main Variables Description
Age Age of the individual
Child(ren) Do you have any children?
Educational Levels Dummies
Higher Vocational High vocational level education
Intermediate General Intermediate general level education
Intermediate Vocational Intermediate vocational level education
Lower Vocational Lower vocational level education
Primary Primary school level education
University University level education
Female Gender of the individual is a woman
Income Income earned in 2016
Income(log) Income earned in 2016, expressed in logarithmic form
Leave Inheritance What is the chance that you will leave an inheritance
No Allowance as Child When you were between 8 and 12 years of age, did you receive
an allowance from your parents then?
No Money Support to Child Do you give large amounts of money to your children in order to
transfer part of your capital to them, or are you planning to do so
in the future?
No SaveTeach as Child Did your (grand)parents stimulate you to save money between
the age of 12 and 16?
Probability Inheritance How likely is it that you will receive an inheritance
in the next 10 years?
Probability Inheritance 10k And how likely is that you will receive an inheritance of more
than e10,000 in the next 10 years?
Probability Inheritance 25k And how likely is that you will receive an inheritance of more
than e25,000 in the next 10 years?
Probability Inheritance 50k And how likely is that you will receive an inheritance of more
than e50,000 in the next 10 years?
Probability Working 62 yrs What are the chances, you think, of you having a full time paid
job at the age of 62 or older?
Retired Dummy variable indicating whether or not the individual is retired
Savings Dummy variable indicating whether the individual saves money or not
Single One component household without children
Wealth Net worth
Wealth(log) Net worth, expressed in logarithmic form
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2.7 Appendix B
Exemptions and rates of gift and inheritance tax are corrected each year with an inflation
correction. An exemption means that the recipient pays donation tax only if the value of it is
higher than a certain amount. The following tables report the gift/inheritance exemptions.
Table 2.16: Donation Tax Exemptions 2016
Relationship with the donor Exemption gift tax Use of the donation
(foster) child 5,304 annually general purpose
(foster) child 18-39 years* 25,449 one-off general purpose
53,016 one-off house
(renovation or repayment mortgage)
remaining 2,122 annually general purpose
Reference year: 2016. All amounts are expressed in euros. Source: Belastingdienst (The Netherlands)
* For the increased exemptions, people can only use it once in their life. If recipient is 40 years old or older, but
her partner is younger than 40: then, exemption applies.
Table 2.17: Inheritance Tax Exemptions 2016
Relation to deceased Exemption
partner 636,180
(spouse / registered partner / notarial cohabitant)
children 20,148
grandchildren 20,148
certain sick and disabled children 60,439
parents 47,715
all others 2,122
Reference year: 2016. All amounts are expressed in euros. Source: Belastingdi-
enst (The Netherlands).
In the case in which the value of the donation is lower than or equal to the exemption
then, the recipient does not pay a gift/inheritance tax; on the other side, if the value of
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donation is higher than the exemption, then, the recipient has to pay the tax on the amount
that exceeds the exemption. The amount of gift/inheritance tax to be paid depends on the
relationship with the donor/deceased and the value of the donation.
Table 2.18: Rates for gift and inheritance tax 2016
Tariff group Value of acquisition Rates percentage
partner and (foster) children 0 - 121,902 10%
more than 121,903 20%
grandchildren and further descendants 0 - 121,902 18%
more than 121,903 36%
remaining 0 - 121,902 30%
more than 121,903 40%
Reference year: 2016. All amounts are expressed in euros. Source: Belastingdienst (The Netherlands).
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2.8 Appendix C
2.8.1 Subjective Distributions of Inheritance Expectations
As explained in Section 2.2 discussing the consistency of probabilities, we present the ap-
proach to derive subjective probability distributions from the observed inheritance expec-
tations data. These probabilities are interpreted as points on the subjective cumulative
probability distribution function of the inheritance expectations of individuals from our
sample.
Parametric Approach
The parametric approach, proposed by Dominitz & Manski (1997), assumes that the reported
probabilities follow from some parametric underlying distribution. Given the distribution
and the reported inheritance expectations IEk, the parameters θi of the distribution can
be estimated by fitting the probabilities implied by the distribution, F (IEk; θi), to those
reported in the data. Assuming that subjective distributions are lognormal, we can write
F (IEk; θi) as:





where Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf and µi and σi are individual specific parameters
to be estimated.
The objective function defining the best possible fit chosen by Dominitz & Manski (1997)
is the sum of the squared differences between implied and reported probabilities. Along this





[Fik − F (IEk;µi, σi)]2
Once the parameters of the lognormal distribution are estimated, we can compute the
descriptive statistics of the subjective inheritance expectations.
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In Table 2.19, it follows the comparison between the observed (original) inheritance ex-
pectations and the ones reconstructed through the parametric approach previously presented.
Table 2.19: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Median Min Max N
Probability Inheritance 0.22 0.32 0.03 0 1 1238
Probability Inheritance 10k 0.14 0.26 0.00 0 1 1238
Probability Inheritance 25k 0.10 0.23 0.00 0 1 1238
Probability Inheritance 50k 0.07 0.19 0.00 0 1 1238
Subjective Inheritance 0.20 0.31 0.00 0 1 1238
Subjective Inheritance 10k 0.13 0.25 0.00 0 1 1238
Subjective Inheritance 25k 0.09 0.22 0.00 0 1 1238
Subjective Inheritance 50k 0.06 0.19 0.00 0 1 1238
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3 “Take the Money and Run”: Dutch Evidence on
Inheritance and Transfer Receiving and Divorce
3.1 Introduction
For years, the role played by inherited wealth as a fundamental driver in matrimonial strate-
gies has always represented a very interesting topic. As pointed out in Pasteau et al. (2017)),
this importance in 19th century Europe was highlighted by Thomas Piketty in his work Cap-
ital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), providing insights into the rigid structure of the
societies of “patrimonial capitalism” that France and Great-Britain constituted at the time.
In his work, Piketty (2014) argued that the last decades have seen a return of the importance
of inherited wealth in those two countries, together with an increase in wealth inequality,
which may lead to a renewed importance of inherited wealth in mating choices.
Inheritance can be conceived as an “unearned income” that, according to the life cycle
model, should affect earnings, consumption, savings, and other economic outcomes (Imbens
et al. (2001)): Brown et al. (2010) used a receipt of inheritance as a wealth shock and found
that it was associated with a significant increase in the probability of retirement, especially
when the inheritance was unexpected. The role of wealth in modelling labour decisions has
been broadly considered for its effect on early retirement (Krueger & Pischke (1991), Brown
et al. (2010), Bloemen & Stancanelli (2001)), on labour market participation Bloemen &
Stancanelli (2001)), and on hours worked Imbens et al. (2001), Henley (2004)). Along these
lines, inheritance might, for example, affect labour supply (Joulfaian & Wilhelm (1994));
indeed, Bloemen & Stancanelli (2001) found that wealth has a significantly positive impact
on reservation wages and a negative impact on employment probability (higher levels of
wealth result in higher reservation wages and higher reservation wages are associated with a
lower employment probability).
Recent evidence has focused on the effect of receiving an inheritance on the Labour
Force Participation (LFP) in married couples; bequests might, indeed, increase the bargain-
ing power of the recipient, affecting his/her LFP, and providing new evidence on the ability
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of spouses to commit to a fully efficient allocation of resources within the household (Blau
& Goodstein (2016)). Bequests represent a component of wealth. Joulfaian (2006) found
that wealth increases by only a fraction of the inheritances received, and implies a marginal
propensity to consume significantly higher than the amount predicted within the perfect
foresight or consumption smoothing frameworks. Wealth changes and their impact on con-
sumption choices have been studied in many aspects with reference to real estate wealth
change (Calcagno et al. (2009)), including inheritance receipt and its impact on labour sup-
ply (Brown et al. (2010)). Recent findings extended their points of view and investigated
potential effects of inheritance receiving on other personal features of individuals, such as,
for example, intention to bequeath (Stark & Nicinska, 2015).
What we want to do in this study consists in providing evidence on another, more per-
sonal, aspect on an individual’s life, i.e., divorce. According to the literature, divorce motives
are a consequence of different factors affecting the risk of divorce such as religion, family-
related features, presence of children, etc. Indeed, along this line, religion has a clear negative
effect on divorce. Consequences of divorce have been widely analyzed from numerous per-
spectives (Amato & Afifi (2006)). The effect of a parental divorce can be significant and
substantial; people who have divorced parents (when they were growing up) might have
higher chances of divorce than others. On the contrary, having children is associated with
lower odds of divorce (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006a). In times when divorce was uncommon,
the higher educated were more likely to divorce than the lower educated; presently, the lower
educated are more likely to divorce than the higher educated (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006a).
Recent studies have focused on the introduction of unilateral divorce legislation (Stevenson
& Wolfers (2006); Wolfers (2006)); along this line, allowing people to file a divorce unilater-
ally increases individual well-being (Stevenson & Wolfers (2006)) and might reduce domestic
violence (Brassiolo (2016)).
Needless to say, features different from a wealth endowment might affect chances of
divorcing; divorce motives might also rely on other, more personal, features such as, for
example, patience.
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Anton Čechov, Russian physician, dramaturge, and author, highlighted in one of his stories
the importance of patience in marital stability:
The chief thing in married life is patience...not love but patience9.
In this regard, the literature has highlighted the important link between time preferences
and marital stability; impatient individuals will seek to exit a marriage as soon as a shock
occurs. An example of the relationship between marriage and marriage stability is the work
of (Compton (2009)); the author, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
data,found that more patient individuals tended to remain in the marriage after a marital
shock, while more impatient individuals tended to look for a “way out”. Similar results come
from the conviction that marriage can be considered as the result of spouses’ willingness to
invest in the long term viability of the marriage and to accept short-term disadvantages, giv-
ing rise to a lower propensity of divorcing (Compton (2009) and De Paola & Gioia (2017)).
Furthermore, women’s labour force participation can be a cause of divorce (De Graaf &
Kalmijn, 2006b); the literature has broadly considered this feature, according to which mar-
riages with a working wife run a higher risk of divorce than marriages in which the wife is
unemployed (Poortman & Kalmijn (2002); Cherlin (1979); Spitze & South (1985); South
& Spitze (1986); Greenstein (1990); Tzeng & Mare (1995); Babka von Gostomski et al.
(1998); South (2001)). An increase in the expected earnings of women, on the other hand,
has the opposite effect, and actually appears to raise the probability of dissolution and re-
duce the propensity to remarry (Becker et al., 1977). In studies of female labour supply,
for example, there is growing awareness that both marital status and fertility decisions are
strongly interrelated with female labour supply decisions and can therefore no longer be
considered exogenous from a lifecycle perspective (van der Klaauw, 1996). In addition to
that, the probability of future divorce strongly depends on female labour market participa-
tion. Interruptions in labour market participation caused by marriages, as well as the birth
and presence of children, can have long-term effects through lower future wages associated
with less labour market experience, making the female more economically dependent on the
9 Anton Čechov, The duel, 1891.
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husband (van der Klaauw (1996) and Pestel (2017)).
This paper aims at studying whether receiving an inheritance or a transfer can, in some
way, enhance the chances of getting divorced, and we contribute to the literature providing
new evidence analysing this relationship. In order to do so, our empirical methodology
involves the use of the DNB Household Survey (DHS), a Dutch panel dataset collected by
the CentERdata that allows study of both psychological and economic aspects of financial
behaviour. This panel survey was launched in 1993 and comprises information on work,
pensions, housing, mortgages, income, possessions, loans, health, economic and psychological
concepts, and personal characteristics. We concentrate our analysis observing Dutch coupled
households in the years between 2002 and 2016.
Starting from the idea that an inheritance receipt might have an impact on various aspects
of an individual’s life, we perform a Cox proportional hazard ratios model estimating the
probability that a married couple divorces and how this probability varies through time,
identified by the duration of the marriage, trying to understand the role of inheritance/gift
receipt, differentiated between inheritances/gifts received by the husband or the wife, and
other covariates that might affect the transition probability.
Findings suggest that, in the case in which the inheritance/gift has been received by
the husband, there is a negative and significant impact on getting divorced while, when it
has been received by the wife, this enhances the chances that separation of the couple will
occur. This signals that receiving an inheritance/gift changes the bargaining power in the
couple: while for the husband, who probably already was in a predominant position in the
household, a wealth endowment, such as an inheritance or a transfer is, does not represent
an incentive to divorce, for the wife, results seem suggesting that that she might perceive a
change in the bargaining enhancing the chances of marital disruption. Presence of child(ren)
in the household seems to deter divorce; indeed, it appears to act as “glue” for the marriage
reducing the chances of separation. Related to the latter variable, possible concerns might
arise about whether any causal conclusion can be drawn from this work: inheritance receipt is
a wealth endowment which, in our analysis, as it will be better explained in the description
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of the main variables, always came before divorce (the inheritance/transfer variable has
been constructed as a lag variable to avoid any simultaneity between inheritance receipt and
divorce); moreover, we also conduct the analysis excluding endogenous regressors such as
the variable reporting the number of children in the household and results still hold. Before
proceeding with the description of the data, it could be interesting to briefly illustrate how
divorce rules work in the Netherlands10 and consider some changes in divorcing procedures
that have occurred in the last two decades in the Netherlands.
Divorce in the Netherlands. As reported from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
(CBS), between 1 April 2001 and 1 March 2009, it was possible for married couples in
the Netherlands to convert their marriage into a registered partnership; this partnership
could then be annulled without having to go to court. For some couples, this so-called
“flash divorce” (flitsscheiding) was a serious alternative to divorce11; the increase in the
number of flash divorces almost completely compensated for the decrease in the number of
divorces in recent years. As shown in Figure 3.1, the highest numbers of flash divorces were
recorded in the years from 2003 to 2005, when around 5,000 couples annually separated using
this procedure. The number of flash divorces was lowest in 2001, when the procedure was
introduced, and in 2009, when it was rescinded.
Arranging a divorce, a legal separation, or the termination of a registered partnership
needs some arrangements to be made. First of all, the couple wishing to legally separate,
divorce, or terminate the registered partnership has to draw up a settlement12 in which
they set out the agreements concerning (possible) children, maintenance, pension, and other
matters; then, they submit a petition for divorce to the court through a lawyer.
There are three ways for married partners to separate: divorce; legal separation (partners
are still married but they do not live together); and dissolution of the marriage after legal
10 The information provided comes from the Rijksoverheid, i.e., the Dutch Government and the Belast-
ingdienst, the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration.
11 In March 2009, the government banned the flash divorce option and processing of divorces reverted to
earlier conditions.
12 Settlements are usually, but not necessarily, drawn up by a lawyer; moreover, there is no obligation to
draw up the settlement.
50
Figure 3.1: Divorces and Flash Divorces - Statistics Netherlands
separation13. After the court issues a divorce decree, individuals must finalise the divorce by
recording it in the registry of births, deaths, marriages, and registered partnerships in the
municipality where they married. One important issue to be considered when talking about
divorce is the cost of divorce proceedings. The costs due to them comprise:
• Court fees: court fees must be paid to file a petition for divorce;
• Legal fees: costs related to the (possible) engagement of a lawyer to file the divorce
petition with the court; and
13 In the case in which the couple has a registered partnership, are in agreement, and do not have children,
they could also terminate the relationship out of court.
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• Mediation fees: the couple could also wish to engage a mediator14.
So far, nothing seems different in the rules related to divorce in the Netherlands; however,
compared with other countries, the Netherlands has different rules concerning the financial
consequences of marriage. In many countries, marriage does not affect the assets of the
spouses; possessions are deemed mutual property starting from the day the couple married,
less premarital assets, gifts, and inheritances. The same cannot be said for the Nether-
lands. Couples who do not arrange a marriage settlement are automatically wed under the
“community of property”; this means that through marriage, all assets become community
property, including all their premarital assets, gifts, and inheritances. At this point, since we
are dealing with inheritance and gifts, it could be interesting to mention how inheritances
and transfers taxation works in the Netherlands since inter-vivos transfers might sometimes
represent close substitutes for inheritances, and may come with tax advantages.
Information on inheritances and gifts taxation in the Netherlands In the
Netherlands, gifts and inheritances are subject to different principles, depending on the
“intergenerational relationship” between the provider of the gift/inheritance and the recipi-
ent. One of the most glaring aspects that comes to mind when talking about a donation or an
inheritance is related to paying taxes; however, according to the Belastingdienst, the Dutch
Tax and Customs Administration, there are some exemptions depending on the amount of
the gift/inheritance and also depending on the relationship with the donor. For example,
in 2016, the maximum amount of a donation from a parent to her son, daughter, or foster
child exempts up to about 53,000 euros once in the life of a child. It is also possible to make
a donation to a child of about 5,300 euros exempt from tax in a year. In Appendix 3.6, we
present some examples concerning exemptions and tax rates on donations/inheritances.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 describe the
data and the empirical methodology, and Section 3.4 concludes the paper.
14 Though not required, a mediator can help individuals make arrangements that work for both of them.
In some cases, legal aid is available to cover some of the costs involved; if they have legal expenses insurance,
the insurer may reimburse them for some or all of the costs.
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3.2 Data Description
Our empirical analysis relies on the DNB Household Survey (DHS), a Dutch panel study
collected by the CentERdata, a survey agency at Tilburg University specialising in Internet
surveys. This panel survey was launched in 1993 and comprises information on work and
pensions, accommodation and mortgages, income and health, assets and liabilities, and
economic and psychological concepts. The questionnaires were sent to the respondents via
the Internet, the respondents filled in the questionnaires at their home computers, and then
answers were sent back in the same way. This implies that the questionnaires were self-
administered and individuals could answer at the most comfortable time for them. It is
important to note that the selection of panel members of the survey was not dependent
on Internet access; indeed, households without a computer or an Internet connection were
provided with the necessary equipment. We focus on coupled households during the years
2002 through 201615. As presented in the introduction, we want to study whether having
received a money endowment, being it an inheritance or gift16, might lead toward marital
disruption. With this in mind, we present the time-series of the different marital statuses
of individuals in our sample; as shown in Figure 3.2, the frequency of divorces is quite low
compared with marriages. For the aim of this work, we constructed the dependent variable
divorce as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the couple divorced and the value
of 0 otherwise.
The other feature we were concerned about is related to inheritance/gift receiving; along
this line, also in order to avoid cases in which divorce occurred before the inheritance receipt,
the respondents having received an inheritance had a lag variable, meaning that it took value
1 in cases in which the individual received the endowment the year before and 0 otherwise.
The share of people who received an inheritance represented around the 6%-8% of our sample
15 The choice of these years lies in the fact that, in the years before 2002, when this survey was the
VSB-CentER savings project, there have been some changes both in the direction management of the survey
and in the sampling procedure, and some individuals drop also out from the survey; with this in mind, we
start the analysis from 2002 being sure that we are able to follow the couples over time.
16 The exact wording of the question asking for inheritance receipt was “Did you receive any inheritances
and/or gifts in (year)?”. Data did not allow us to distinguish whether the wealth endowment was an
inheritance or a gift.
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Figure 3.2: Marital Status Composition
(a) Marital Status Composition (b) Marital Status Composition
population. Since we were dealing with couples, we made a distinction between cases in which
the inheritance/gift had been received by the husband and whether it had been received by
the wife (see Figure 3.3); in this way, when conducting the empirical analysis, we should be
able to capture any bargaining power, if present, in the couple.
Figure 3.3: Inheritance Receipt
(a) Husband as Recipient (b) Wife as Recipient
One possible concern could be related to the fact the inheritance/gift receipt, even if
individually received, is perceived at the couple level so that the partner who does not
receive it answers positively to the question if the beneficiary is his/her partner: however,
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there are very few cases (around 50 couples) in which both spouses affirm that they have
got an inheritance/gift17.
Needless to say, features different from a wealth endowment might affect the chances
of divorcing; this represents the reason why we controlled for some variables related to the
household (all variables are described in Table 3.4) such as, for example, the mean age in
the household and the difference in ages between spouses, a few dummies for educational
level of the head of the household and the differential in educational attainments between
partners, income of both couple components, and child(ren) present in the household.
For the latter variable, we report the number of child(ren) present in the household since
we expected that the presence of children in the household should have had a different
impact on the chances of getting divorced compared with the mere presence of children in
the household.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.5; we differentiate between wife, husband,
and household characteristics. On average, it appears that there is great differences between
personal income of spouses; indeed, the mean income of wives (around e6,000) is much
lower compared with male income (around e16,000). This fact is also reflected in the lower
percentage of working wives (around 44%) versus a value of around 60% for working hus-
bands; concerning educational attainments, there are no great differences between women
and men even though, if we focus our attention on university education level it appears that
the percentage of husbands with a university level of education is higher compared to wives
(around 13& versus 7%, respectively).
Eventually, it might be worth noticing that the mean duration of marriage, variable that
represents our time period for the empirical analysis we present in next section, is around
23 years, quite high considering that overall, the average age ranges between 53-55 years.
17 We also conduct the analysis dropping cases in which both partners state to have received an endowment
the year before and results hold.
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present the empirical methodology used, aiming at a better understanding
of the relationship between inheritance/gift receiving and the chances of getting divorced.
We perform a survival analysis through the Cox proportional hazard ratios model. The
Cox (1972) model is expressed by the hazard function denoted by h(t); the hazard function
can be interpreted as the risk of divorcing at time t. It can be estimated as follows:
h(t) = h0(t)exp(b1x1 + b2x2 + ...+ bpxp)
where, t represents the survival time, h(t) is the hazard function determined by a set of
p covariates (x1, x2, ..., xp), and the coefficients (b1, b2, ..., bp) measure the impact. The term
h0 is called the baseline hazard. In particular, we estimate the probability that a married
couple divorces and how this probability varies through time, identified by the duration of the
marriage (in years) trying to understand the role of inheritance/gift receipt, differentiated
between inheritances/gifts received by the husband or the wife, and other covariates that
might affect the transition probability.
Hence, data were set as generally done in survival analysis or unemployment duration
models, in which our time analysis was the duration of the marriage and the potential failure
was identified by the end of the marriage, i.e., the divorce. In this way, we were able to follow
the couples until the separation occurred18. Therefore, we estimate the hazard function h(t)
that determines the probability that the couple moves from marriage to divorce at time t,
i.e., the risk of divorcing at time t, identified as the duration of the marriage. The set of
covariates we control for (presented and discussed in the previous section) are , for example,
whether the recipient of the inheritance was the husband or the wife, a few dummies for
the educational level of the head of the household, personal income of both partners (in
logarithmic form), etc. We also included the delta in educational level between spouses with
the aim of capturing bargaining power, if any.
Results are presented in Table 3.1. It appears that, in the case in which the inheri-
18 Those who already divorced at the beginning of the time period analysis are not present in our dataset.
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tance/gift has been received by the husband, there is a negative and significant impact on
getting divorced while, when it has been received by the wife, this enhances the chances that
separation of the couple will occur.
This suggests that receiving an inheritance/gift changes the bargaining power in the couple:
while for the husband, who probably already was in a predominant position in the household,
a wealth endowment, such as an inheritance or a transfer is, does not represent an incentive
to divorce, for the wife, results seem suggesting that that she might perceive a change in the
bargaining enhancing the chances of marital disruption. The presence of child(ren) in the
household19 seems to deter divorce. This result is in line with the literature supporting the
fact that children increase marital stability above all when they are very young (Waite &
Lillard (1991), Huber & Spitze (1980) and (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006a)).
At this point, an important piece of information that might be worth observing concerns
the amount of the inheritance received by individuals20; therefore, since individuals were
asked to report the amount of the inheritance/gift received, we exploited this information
and we ran a regression in which we used a control, instead of the dummies indicating who
benefited from the wealth endowment, the amount (in logarithm) of the inheritance/gift
received. Results, presented in Table 3.2, confirm previous findings. It seems that a gender
effect is present, suggesting that, when the inheritance/transfer is received by the wives,
divorce is more likely to occur. This fact could be partially related to some traits we do not
observe. Kalmijn et al. (2004) argued that the validity of economic explanations of divorce,
i.e., high likelihood of divorce if women work for pay and have attractive labour market
resources, is conditional on cultural values. Indeed, cultural hypotheses have argued that
divorce chances increase if women adhere to emancipatory norms, independent from their
labour market positions. Therefore, also in this case, it appears that the bargaining power
has changed after receiving an inheritance/gift.
19 We also conduct the analysis excluding endogenous regressors such as the variable reporting the number
of children in the household and results still hold.
20 Unfortunately, we do not have information about the type of inheritance/gift so we cannot distinguish
whether the inheritance consisted in money or real estate, etc., and we do not know who bequeathed or
made the transfer.
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Along this line, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the delta in edu-
cational level in the household supports the importance of bargaining power in the couple.
Indeed, as long as the delta in educational attainments increases, keeping constant the ed-
ucation of the head of household for which we control for, meaning that the educational
attainment of the wife is lower, the decrease in the chances of getting divorced signals the
low bargaining power on the side of the wife. Again, and in line with the previous results,
the presence of children seems to act as “glue” for the marriage and diminishes the chances
of separation.
Starting from the fact that, from previous results, it appears that bargaining power
in the couple is present, we analyze whether results change when considering the income
distribution of the wife, the figure less “powerful” in the couple. Therefore, we split the
analysis between two cases: if the income of the wife belongs to the bottom quintiles of the
distribution and if the income relies in the top classes of wives’ income distribution. Results
are reported in Table 3.3; it appears that the inheritance receipt enhances the chances of
getting divorced when the wife’s income is low. These findings can be explained by the fact
that, potentially, women belonging to the bottom of income distribution also represent the
ones whose bargaining power in the couple is quite unreal so, they embody the ones for whom
an inheritance receipt might represent an empowerment leading toward marital disruption;
on the other side, we do not observe any enhancement in chances of getting divorced for
the case in which in the couple the wife belongs to top levels of income distribution; as for
the results of previous specifications related to the inheritance receipt by the husband, for
wives with high incomes, whose bargaining power could potentially be almost to an equal
extent in the couple, a wealth endowment, such as an inheritance or a transfer is, does not
represent an incentive to divorce. Also in this case, considering the first column of Table 3.3,
the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the delta in educational level in the
household supports the importance of bargaining power in the couple; indeed, as long as the
delta in educational attainments increases the decrease in the chances of getting divorced
signals the low bargaining power on the side of the wife.
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Table 3.1: Effect of Inheritance on Divorce
Cox Model
Inheritance Receipt Husband* -36.4612***
(0.5050)
Inheritance Receipt Wife* 2.4491***
(0.7317)
Mean Age in hh -0.0512***
(0.0139)
Delta Age in hh -0.0871**
(0.0364)
Child(ren) in hh -1.1370**
(0.4628)
Primary Education of hh 0.3919
(0.8483)
Low Vocational Education of hh 0.8994
(0.7080)
Intermediate General Education 1.9834**
(0.8676)












Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: DHS 2002-2016. * Dummy variables
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Table 3.2: Effect of Amount of Inheritance on Divorce
Cox Model
Inheritance Receipt Husband (log) -8.3404***
(0.3517)
Inheritance Receipt Wife (log) 0.2055*
(0.1219)
Mean Age in hh -0.0519***
(0.0152)
Delta Age in hh -0.0965***
(0.0349)
Child(ren) in hh -1.1327**
(0.5083)
Primary Education of hh -1.3359***
(0.4243)
Low Vocational Education of hh -0.0717
(0.5996)












Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: DHS 2002-2016. * Dummy variables
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Table 3.3: Effect of Amount of Inheritance on Divorce - Difference by Income Distribution
Bottom Quintiles of Wife Income Top Quintiles of Wife Income
Inheritance Receipt Husband* -36.4270*** -38.7553***
(0.5775) (0.9487)
Inheritance Receipt Wife* 2.8481*** -38.9234***
(0.6416) (1.9053)
Mean Age in hh -0.0551*** 0.0468
(0.0158) (0.0834)
Delta Age in hh -0.0722** -0.1962***
(0.0292) (0.0694)
Child(ren) in hh -1.0425** -0.1886
(0.5287) (0.6302)
Primary Education of hh -1.0868**
(0.5101)
Low Vocational Education of hh 0.3275 -42.4695***
(0.4490) (1.1863)
Intermediate General Education 3.7105
(2.3113)
Delta in Educational Level in hh -0.4920*** 0.1109
(0.1786) (0.3469)
Working Husband -1.3801** 40.8260***
(0.6805) (7.3718)
Working Wife 0.2995 -40.3141***
(0.9813) (1.1277)




Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: DHS 2002-2016. * Dummy variables
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3.4 Final Remarks
Divorce motives might be consequences of different factors affecting risks of divorce. Litera-
ture has provided evidence on some of them: religion has a clear negative effect on divorce;
people with divorced parents might have higher chances of divorce than others; on the con-
trary, having children can be associated with lower odds of divorce (Waite & Lillard (1991),
Huber & Spitze (1980) and (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006a)). Furthermore, women’s labour
force participation can be a cause of divorce (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006b). An increase in
the expected earnings of women, on the other hand, has the opposite effects: it appears to
raise the probability of dissolution and to reduce the propensity to remarry (Becker et al.,
1977). In the study of the female labour supply, for example, there has been growing aware-
ness that both marital status and fertility decisions are strongly interrelated with female
labour supply decisions and can therefore no longer be considered exogenous from a lifecycle
perspective (van der Klaauw, 1996). In addition to that, the probability of future divorce
strongly depends on female labour market participation. Interruptions in labour market
participation caused by marriages, as well as the birth and presence of children, can have
long-term effects through lower future wages associated with less labour market experience,
making the female more economically dependent on the husband (van der Klaauw (1996)
and Pestel (2017)).
This paper aimed at studying whether a wealth endowment, in this case, having received
an inheritance or a transfer, enhanced the chances of marital disruption. In order to do
so, we used the DHS panel dataset from the Netherlands, concentrating our attention on
the years between 2002 and 2016. To analyze this relationship, we performed a survival
analysis through the Cox proportional hazard ratios model; in particular, we estimate the
probability that a married couple divorces and how this probability varies through time,
identified by the duration of the marriage, trying to understand the role of inheritance/gift
receipt, differentiated between inheritances/gifts received by the husband or the wife, and
other covariates that might affect the transition probability. The set of covariates we control
for are, for example, whether the recipient of the inheritance was the husband or the wife, a
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few dummies for the educational level of the head of the household, personal income of both
partners (in logarithmic form), etc. We also included the delta in educational level between
spouses with the aim of capturing bargaining power, if any. Findings suggest that, in the
case in which the inheritance/gift has been received by the husband, there is a negative and
significant impact on getting divorced while, when it has been received by the wife, this
enhances the chances that separation of the couple will occur. This signals that receiving
an inheritance/gift changes the bargaining power in the couple: while for the husband, who
probably already was in a predominant position in the household, a wealth endowment, such
as an inheritance or a transfer is, does not represent an incentive to divorce, for the wife,
results seem suggesting that that she might perceive a change in the bargaining enhancing
the chances of marital disruption. We also checked whether the size of the inheritance
matters exploiting the amount of the inheritance/gift received. Results confirm previous
findings suggesting that, when the inheritance/transfer is received by the wives, divorce is
more likely to occur. Presence of child(ren) in the household seems to deter divorce; indeed,
it appears to act as “glue” for the marriage reducing the chances of separation. One possible
concern could be related to the fact it could be that individuals who expect an inheritance
opt for separating from the partner in order to not incur the possibility of splitting the
future amount received. However, the current data do not allow to check for inheritance
expectations; maybe, a future study could try to analyze a relationship between inheritance
expectations and probability of divorcing.
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3.5 Appendix A
3.5.1 Variables Description and Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.4: Description of Variables
Main Variables Description
Individual Variables
Age Age of the individual
Income Income earned
Income(log) Income earned, expressed in logarithmic form
Inheritance Receipt Dummy variable indicating whether or not
the individual received an inheritance
Educational Levels Dummies
Primary Primary school level education
Lower Vocational Lower vocational level education
Intermediate General Intermediate general level education
Intermediate Vocational Intermediate vocational level education
Higher Vocational High vocational level education
University University level education
Working Dummy variable indicating whether or not
is working
Household Variables
Child(ren) in hh Number of children in the household
Divorced Dummy variable indicating whether or not
the couple divorced
Duration of Marriage Variable indicating the number of years of marriage
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Wife Characteristics
Income 6036.83 12263.58 0 335153.7
Age 53.29 14.49 21 99
Inheritance Receipt 0.06 0.15 0 1
Educational Level Dummies
Primary 0.07 0.26 0 1
Lower Vocational 0.33 0.47 0 1
Intermediate General 0.12 0.32 0 1
Intermediate Vocational 0.18 0.39 0 1
Higher Vocational 0.22 0.42 0 1
University 0.07 0.26 0 1
Working 0.44 0.50 0 1
Husband Characteristics
Income 16394.15 22578.09 0 579584
Age 55.03 14.76 17 94
Inheritance Receipt 0.05 0.18 0 1
Educational Level Dummies
Primary 0.04 0.20 0 1
Lower Vocational 0.26 0.44 0 1
Intermediate General 0.09 0.29 0 1
Intermediate Vocational 0.22 0.41 0 1
Higher Vocational 0.26 0.44 0 1
University 0.13 0.34 0 1
Working 0.60 0.49 0 1
Household Characteristics
Duration of marriage 22.61 15.88 0 84
Divorced 0.09 0.30 0 1





Exemptions and rates of gift and inheritance tax are corrected each year with an inflation
correction. An exemption means that the recipient pays donation tax only if the value of it is
higher than a certain amount. The following tables report the gift/inheritance exemptions.
Table 3.6: Donation Tax Exemptions 2016
Relationship with the donor Exemption gift tax Use of the donation
(foster) child 5,304 annually general purpose
(foster) child 18-39 years* 25,449 one-off general purpose
53,016 one-off house
(renovation or repayment mortgage)
remaining 2,122 annually general purpose
Reference year: 2016. All amounts are expressed in euros. Source: Belastingdienst (The Netherlands)
* For the increased exemptions, people can only use it once in their life. If recipient is 40 years old or older, but
her partner is younger than 40: then, exemption applies.
Table 3.7: Inheritance Tax Exemptions 2016
Relation to deceased Exemption
partner 636,180
(spouse / registered partner / notarial cohabitant)
children 20,148
grandchildren 20,148
certain sick and disabled children 60,439
parents 47,715
all others 2,122
Reference year: 2016. All amounts are expressed in euros. Source: Belastingdi-
enst (The Netherlands).
In the case in which the value of the donation is lower than or equal to the exemption
then, the recipient does not pay a gift/inheritance tax; on the other side, if the value of
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donation is higher than the exemption, then, the recipient has to pay the tax on the amount
that exceeds the exemption. The amount of gift/inheritance tax to be paid depends on the
relationship with the donor/deceased and the value of the donation.
Table 3.8: Rates for gift and inheritance tax 2016
Tariff group Value of acquisition Rates percentage
partner and (foster) children 0 - 121,902 10%
more than 121,903 20%
grandchildren and further descendants 0 - 121,902 18%
more than 121,903 36%
remaining 0 - 121,902 30%
more than 121,903 40%
Reference year: 2016. All amounts are expressed in euros. Source: Belastingdienst (The Netherlands).
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4 Credit Access and Approval
Joint with Paola De Vincentiis, Eleonora Isaia, and Maria Cristina Rossi
4.1 Introduction
Discrimination in obtaining credit exists if people of different races or gender, controlling for
all other factors, have different access to credit by having different probability of obtaining
a loan or getting it at a different rate (Asiedu et al., 2012). Several papers have focused
on whether discrimination is at work and to what extent. Looking, in particular, at the
gender dimension, the empirical literature shows that indeed women receive less favourable
treatment in the credit market.
Credit approval, however, is conditional on having asked for credit. Asking for credit is
an individual choice, a complex process that underlies several mechanisms at work leading
to the decision on whether to consider credit to fund an investment. Focusing on credit for
firms’ investment, rather than credit for consumption, the firm structure (e.g., business size,
age, and sector of activity) would undeniably play a key role in shaping funding channels for
an investment.
Would women differ in the way they fund an investment for their firms?
Female- and male-led enterprises show significant differences in the financial structure of
firms (see Cesaroni (2010), for a survey, and more recently Stefani & Vacca (2013)). Evidence
shows that women-led firms rely less on external capital than a personal one, and they tend
to start with relatively lower capital. This evidence is also shown in future investments
(Carter & Shaw (2006); Coleman & Robb (2009)).
Why should the capital structure of firms differ between genders?
Women experience more troubles in getting funded. Some sources of finance, such as venture
capital, fund very few women-led businesses (3% of total venture capitals are those funded




This low percentage could also be explained by the fact that few female enterprises use
venture capital to a very limited extent (Aspray & Cohoon, 2007). All evidence leads to
an ex-ante expectation of lower exposure to external capital when the firm is led by a
woman. To this extent, we want to test whether this is true with regard to credit access to
plan an investment. We do so by using a unique firm-level dataset, the RIL, on a sample
representative of Italian firms.
The main features of female firms, other than capital structure, are that they are on
average younger and smaller than male businesses, and more concentrated in the commercial
and service sectors. Controlling for the type of business led by women will purge the data
from the relationship between external finance and female-led firms.
Being able to rely on a survey representative of the whole sample of Italian firms, exclud-
ing the agricultural sector, we claim we can have generalised results for the population of
firms, and we also break down the results between type of firm and dimension. We use the
variable of gender of the decision-maker in the firm (the questionnaire identifies the person
who is responsible for the firm, whether the CEO, manager, or owner). Our approach is sim-
ilar in spirit to that of Ghignoni et al. (2018) who, using the same dataset, identify whether
more educated firm leaders are also associated with fewer temporary jobs in the firm they
lead.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the gender of the firm’s main decision-maker
is exogenously determined, and we interpret the results as causal. In principle, one might
argue that the gender of the decision-maker is a choice that can be determined by similar
(unobserved) factors as credit applications or credit approval chances of the firm (or might
even be affected by credit approval history). This is something we cannot analyze with the
data at hand. If it is indeed the case, our findings should be interpreted as associations
rather than causal effects.
Results show that women, when they are the responsible people of the firm, seem to ask
less for a loan, showing less propensity to search for loan funding. Results on being successful
in obtaining credit do not show evidence of gender bias.
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Results point to a lower demand of women-led businesses rather than a lower probability of
success in obtaining credit.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. In section 4.2, we revise the main contributions
in this area of empirical research. In section 4.3, we describe the data and how the sample is
built up, and we provide the main descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 illustrates our regression
results and the specification model, and section 4.5 concludes the paper.
4.2 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review
Small businesses led by women do not access credit on equal footing with those led by men.
There is relevant evidence pointing in this direction, even if the issue is still controversial.
The problem seems to emerge and has been explored in the literature at three different levels
(see Table 4.1).
First level: Companies managed by women tend to apply less frequently for loans.
A few papers find that women-led SMEs tend to request fewer loans and finance their activity
to a greater extent with their own funds or trade credit. Coleman (2000) finds that women-
owned small businesses tend to rely less on external financing as a source of capital, despite
not being discriminated against when applying for loans. Ongena & Popov (2016) explore
the issue using a sample of European immigrants to the US. They find that female-owned
SMEs apply less frequently for loans and that the phenomenon is positively correlated to the
intensity of gender bias in the mother country of the immigrant. The gender bias measure
is built on the basis of the answers given by survey respondents to a particular question
focused on the role of women within the family.
A voice out of chorus is a paper by Stefani & Vacca (2013). These authors claim that the
different frequencies in loan applications between men-led and women-led SMEs disappears
when controlling more attentively for firm-specific features.
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Second level: When applying for credit, SMEs managed by women face rejection more
frequently than male companies do.
The evidence is more controversial on this second issue. Asiedu et al. (2012) explore both
racial and gender discrimination in the access to credit, finding a higher denial rate for all
minorities compared to small businesses owned by white men. Bellucci et al. (2010) show
that female entrepreneurs face tighter credit availability and are more likely to pledge collat-
eral. Cesaroni et al. (2013) find that during the subprime financial crisis, women-run firms
suffered from a more pronounced contraction of credit availability, after controlling for all
the observable characteristics of the firms. However, they do not have data on loan applica-
tions to understand if the greater credit rationing was due to supply-driven discrimination,
demand-driven factors, or a combination of both.
On the contrary, other papers report no substantial difference in the availability of credit
for female businesses when controlling for the sector, the dimension, and other structural
features of the firm. Blanchflower et al. (2003), in a paper focused on the difficulties faced by
black minorities in accessing credit, find that other disadvantaged groups like women and
other ethnic minorities do not encounter similar issues. Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzzo (1998) find
that women’s access to mortgage credit is comparable to that of white men, with even some
benefits to women located in concentrated markets. Stefani & Vacca (2013) confirm that
not only the application, but also the denial rate does not seem to differ between male- and
female-run small companies when taking all relevant factors into consideration. Ongena &
Popov (2016) also confirm that even if women apply less for loans, no significant difference
in the approval rate emerges.
Third level: When granted credit, women-led SMEs are charged a higher interest rate.
Muravyev et al. (2009) find evidence that female-run firms are less likely to obtain credit and
pay a higher interest rate when the loan application is approved. Alesina et al. (2013), using
a database of Italian companies, find evidence that micro-companies managed by women
pay more on overdraft facilities. The higher cost of credit still holds true when controlling
for the level of risk and for specific features of local credit markets. Other papers (see Table
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4.1), on the contrary, maintain that the economic terms applied to credit are not correlated
to gender.
What may be the roots of the phenomena observed?
A first explanation could be that female-led companies face worst credit access conditions
for the very fact they are led by women. Due to cultural reasons and gender bias, bankers
would trust these companies less than those in which the reins are in the hands of men. A
slightly different, although related, explanation could be that women lack self-confidence.
This, in turn, would manifest through self-selection and opt-out from loan application pro-
cesses. In other words, women would not ask for loans because they are convinced they
would be denied if they did so, even when this is not really the case.
A third explanation looks at risk aversion, especially in financial-decision environments.
Women could apply less for loans because they are less bold and aggressive in their man-
agement behaviour. A rich stream of literature investigates this perspective and finds that
women tend to be more cautious and defensive in their risk-taking strategies (Powell & Ansic
(1997), Byrnes et al. (1999), Barber & Odean (2001), Eckel & Grossman (2008), Croson &
Gneezy (2009)). Interestingly, Bellucci et al. (2010) find that this gender difference emerges
not only when loan applicants are women, but also when loan officers are women: they
tend be more prudent and restrict credit availability to new, unestablished borrowers more
than their male counterparts. On the same line is the strong evidence found in microcredit,
where women are more trustworthy, more prudent, and less likely to make default because
of unwise money management.
Finally, the explanation could lie in the prevalent features of female-run companies The
need for bank financing and the riskiness of the companies perceived by lenders could be
related not to the gender of the manager or the owner but to the financial features, size, and
sector of the company. In particular, descriptive evidence shows that female-run companies
tend to be smaller and are concentrated in commercial and service sectors. We are able to
control for these factors in our analysis so that the effect of having a woman heading a firm
is detected.
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Our work focuses on the frequency of loan application by firms when the decision-maker
is a woman. Among the issues discussed above, this aspect is the least explored. The novelty
of our paper is the use of a dataset representative of the firm sample, rather than having
a subsample of firms. This sample allows us to better control for size effects and check if
the opt-out phenomenon is still discernible in large companies when the person in charge for
strategic decision-making is a woman.
We also check whether the fact that a company belongs to an international group makes
any difference. The effect may be controversial, and we do not have a clear expectation
on the matter. On one side, the exposure to an international environment could lower any
culturally inherited barrier and make the woman approach bank financing more easily. On
the other side, knowing that gender bias is higher in Southern Mediterranean countries, such
as Italy, could make female managers reluctant to approach the local banking system and
prefer intragroup financing in order to benefit from better financing conditions.
We control as well for other features of the firms managed by women that may encour-
age or discourage the demand for loans by affecting the risk profile and the need for bank
capital. The list of variables used as regressors, and their explanation, is listed in Table
4.4. Important aspects to consider in this regard are the age of the company, the sector,
the profitability, and the investments undertaken, especially for innovation in products and
processes.
We control for the features of the woman leading the company, looking in particular at edu-
cation level and age. We expect the culture-determined reluctance towards loan application
to be negatively correlated to education. As for the age, we expect younger women to ap-
proach bank financing more similarly to men. In particular, we verify the intensity of the
opt-out phenomenon by age bracket, and we explore the existence of a non-linear relation
by including a squared-age term in the regression.
Finally, we include regional dummies to capture any local difference in credit offer, macroe-
conomic environment, and intensity of gender bias.
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Table 4.1: Female-run SMEs and access to bank financing Literature review
Lower application rate? Higher denial rate? Higher interest rate?
Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzzo (1998) No No No
Coleman (2000) Yes No Yes
Blanchflower et al. (2003) n.a. No No
Alesina et al. (2013) n.a. n.a. Yes
Muravyev et al. (2009) n.a. Yes Yes
Bellucci et al. (2010) n.a. Yes No
Asiedu et al. (2012) n.a. Yes Yes
Cesaroni et al. (2013) n.a. Yes n.a.
Stefani & Vacca (2013) No No n.a.
Ongena & Popov (2016) Yes No No
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We run the empirical analysis drawing from the sample of the Employer and Employee
Survey (RIL) conducted by INAPP (previously ISFOL) in 2015. The RIL is a nationally
representative sample of over 24,000 partnership and limited companies operating in the
non-agricultural private sector in Italy. The RIL contains a rich set of information about
personnel organisation, industrial relations, and other workplace characteristics. It also
includes the demographics of the firm’s decision-maker, such as the level of education, as
well as age brackets and gender. For our purpose, the RIL has the advantage of containing
the characteristics of the responsible person of the firm, as well as some investment channel
strategy, such as having requested credit to fund investments, the key variable of our analysis.
With regard to the sample selection, we only consider ‘active’ firms, meaning that we exclude
wound-up firms or bankrupt firms, with a final sample of 29,789 observations.
As mentioned in the introduction, this dataset allows us to concentrate our attention
not only on small and medium firms but also on large ones, so it could be interesting to see
the distribution of firm size and also the age of the firms, highlighting (potential) gender
differences.
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The firm size is measured in terms of employees to categorise enterprises; enterprises
qualify as micro, small, medium, and large as follows:
• A firm falls into the micro category if it employs fewer than 10 persons.
• A firm falls into the small category if it employs fewer than 50 persons.
• A firm falls into the medium-sized category if it employs fewer than 250 persons
• A firm falls into the large-sized category if it employs more than 250 persons
From Tables 4.2 and 4.3, we can notice that women are decision-makers above all in
micro, small, or medium firms and mainly in ‘young’ firms. In detail, among large firms,
the majority of these firms are led by men; along this line, the majority of ‘aged’ firms are
led by men (women’s share in leading firms reaches not even 1% of firms aged more than 50
years of activity).
Table 4.2: Firm size differentiated by gender of decision-maker
Type of firm Man Led Firm Woman Led Firm Total
Micro Firm 12,467 2,710 15,177
Small Firm 8,123 1,133 9,256
Medium Firm 3,850 359 4,209
Large Firm 1,059 61 1,120
Total 25,499 4,263 29,762
Table 4.5 reports the descriptive statistics. Starting from the key variables on gender
bias and credit demand, 17 percent of the sample firms asked for credit in 2015, with quite a
successful acceptance rate equal to 87 percent. As long as the manager’s gender is concerned,
women run a small minority of firms, only 13 percent of the businesses in the sample.
Turning to the firm characteristics, such as size, sector of business, and geographical locations
in Italy, it is noteworthy that the northern part of the country is predominant. It is worth
reminding that firms fall into the SMEs category if they employ fewer than 250 persons and
have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euro and/or an annual balance sheet total
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Table 4.3: Age categories of firms differentiated by gender of decision-maker
Age of firm Man Led Firm Woman Led Firm Total
Up to 25 years 13,538 2,556 16,094
Between 25-50 years 10,692 1,549 12,241
Between 50-75 years 1,036 136 1,172
Between 75-100 years 173 20 193
Between 100-125 years 47 2 49
More than 125 years 13 0 13
Total 25,499 4,263 29,762
not exceeding 43 million euro. In our sample, on average, the average number of employees
is 70 units, but ranges from 0 to over 140,000, while firm revenue is around 37 million euros,
but climbs to a maximum of 191 trillion euros. Therefore, our analysis embraces all types
of enterprises, spanning from micro to large companies. Dimensions are obviously related
to the firm age, which, on average is 26 years old, suggesting that our sample reflects credit
needs and attitudes of more mature businesses. Focusing on the organisation structure, we
look at whether a company belongs to a group or is independent. As expected, 85 percent of
the sample is independent, while only 11 percent belongs to a national group and 3 percent
to a foreign one.
Regarding the sector, constructions and commerce represents the larger sector - 13 percent
of the firms - while all other sectors have almost equal weight.
Moving to the main entrepreneurs’ characteristics, they can be synthesised as follows.
The average age is quite mature: almost 30 percent of entrepreneurs in the sample are
more than 60 years old, while only 6 percent is less than 40. Therefore, more than half of
business managers are concentrated around middle age. Such age distribution is reflected
in the education level. Seven out of 10 entrepreneurs have at least a high school diploma,
even if only three achieved a university degree or higher qualification. On the contrary,
less-educated managers - i.e., middle/elementary school level - represent 20 percent of the
sample.
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Graphs 4.1 and 4.2 report information on credit demand and credit approval for men and
women. Graph 4.1 gives a picture of the relationship between credit attitude and gender.
It shows that female entrepreneurs tend to ask for credit much less than their male peers.
The younger the age of the firm, the weaker the demand for credit is and the larger the gap
between women and men is. However, after many years of experience, growing up a long
credit and business history (more than 70 years), this credit gender relationship reverses
its trend. Such evidence might suggest that women need time to become more confident,
overcome their fears, and believe to be creditworthy.
Graph 4.3 reports information on the age categories and gender of the main respondents
of the firms. Despite the fact that only 13 percent of the entrepreneurs in the sample are
women, it is interesting to notice that the percentage of male entrepreneurs increases as they
get older, while the percentage of female entrepreneurs decreases. Therefore, our picture
shows that our female subsample is proportionally younger than the male one.
4.4 Regression Results
4.4.1 Empirical Model and Robustness Checks
The empirical strategy focuses on the drivers that might affect credit demand and credit
approval; to do so, we have two different dependent variables: 1) credit demand, expressed
as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there has been a loan application during the
year 2015, and 0 otherwise, and 2) credit approval, a dummy variable that assumes a value
of 1 if credit demand has been fully approved.
CreditDemandf = β0 + β1femalef + β2Xf + εf
CreditApprovalf = θ0 + θ1femalef + θ2Xf + µf
Where f stands for the firm identifier, and individual regressors such as female and
education relate to the person responsible for the firm (manager, owner, or CEO)22.
22 For each firm, it is asked who is the responsible person (i.e., who makes the strategic decisions). The
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The explanatory variables include all variables characterising the firm, as well as variables
characterising the decision-maker of the firm (as specified in the question described in the
introduction). For example, we use the age of the firm, which should capture a different
‘stability’ and degree of being renowned by the local community, including the financial
sector. The decision for credit is likely to be determined by how rooted the firm is in the
local community. The size of the firm could play an important role, firstly as larger firms
could be better equipped to ask for credit and considered more solid and less risky in the
financial market. Firm size could also interact with the features of the decision-maker. In
small firms, the role of the decision-maker is likely to be pivotal (as s/he is the only person
to make decisions). On the other side, in medium and larger firms we expect a more diluted
impact of the individual variables characterising the decision-maker.
For this reason, we also include interaction terms between the gender of the firm’s decision-
maker and the firm size23.
The main issue we are concerned about in this work is the role played by the fact that
the person in charge for strategic decision-making is a woman. We also include the following
control variables that might be distinguished between structural features of the firm (e.g.,
number of employees, share of female employees, age of the company, profitability, belonging
to a national or international group, sector dummies, dummies for the legal status of the
firm) and characteristics mainly related to the main respondent of the firm (e.g., age and
education level); in Table 4.4, dependent and independent variables are described. Finally,
we include regional dummies to capture any local difference in credit offer, macroeconomic
environment, and intensity of gender bias.
In Table 4.6, we report results from Probit regression. We find significant evidence only
for credit demand (coefficient statistically significant at 1 percent level) but no significant
effect for credit approval; in particular, it appears that women-led firms have two percentage
possible answers are: 1) the owner/the family owner or CEO, 2) manager chosen within the firm, or 3)
manager chosen outside the firm.
23 We also run other specifications of our model without firms that have opted for layoffs (defined in Italy
as ‘Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’), reduction in terms of number of employess, etc. without affecting final
results.
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points lower probability of asking for credit than men-led ones. It is interesting to notice that
it seems that younger decision-makers, those belonging to an age ranging between 15 and
39 years old, apply more compared to more experienced decision-makers; however, younger
individuals might have less chance of getting the loan application approved (six percentage
points lower probability).
One of the possible concerns in our analysis is the selection issue. Obtaining credit is
subsequent to having asked for it, hence, the probability of succeeding in obtaining credit
has been estimated for the subsample of those firms that applied for a loan. The selection
of the sample is far from random, and this feature could affect final results. Put differently,
only good debtors ask for credit. To allow for the possibility that selection issues affect
the estimates, we also estimate our model using a Heckman model (the so-called Heckman
Probit, taking into account the dichotomous nature of the main dependent variable). We
use as an exclusion restriction variable a variable capturing the general availability of credit,
which we proxy with the number of branches. The branch density, an index reporting the
concentration of banks by regions24, is strongly significant in the selection equation (and
has no predictive power in the main equation). Results, reported in Table 4.7, are similar
to the results not correcting for selectivity and show no evidence of selection at work. The
correlation coefficient, ρ, is not significantly different from zero.
As previously pointed out, firm size could also interact with the characteristics of the
decision-maker. The rationale is that the relationship between the main responsible person
and the credit approach in a firm could be diluted, thus making the association between
the credit decision and the responsible person less clear. Thus, in Table 4.8, we include
as a control interaction terms between the gender of the firm decision-maker and the firm
size: even if the ‘female’ effect does not point out any differences among firms’ sizes, it is
interesting to notice that the negative impact related to the gender of the decision-maker
holds, and it appears that medium firms apply more for credit (almost seven percentage
points higher probability than small firms) as well as large firms, which ask more for credit
24 To avoid problems of multicollinearity, we do not add regional dummies as controls, but we substitute
them with macro-area dummies (North, Centre, South).
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but less than medium ones. Along this line, aiming at capturing any differences related to
how rooted the firm is in the local community, we exploit the age of the firm categorised in
three main classes25 interacting with the gender of the decision-maker. Results are reported
in Table 4.9: it appears that ‘young’ women-led firms demand for credit less compared to
the ones that are probably more well known by the local community.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we make use of a representative dataset for the year 2015 of Italian firms,
the RIL, which excludes agricultural firms, to detect the determinants of credit demand and
credit approval, using a gender lens. Our results, robust to different specifications, show that
a gender-detrimental effect is found at a significant level only for credit demand. Instead, we
find no significant evidence that credit approval is negatively affected by the gender of the
firm manager. This result holds also when we allow for selection in having asked for credit,
which could be responsible for a self-selection channel through which only good debtors ask
for credit.




4.6.1 Description of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.4: Description of Variables
Name of the Variable Description of Variables
Credit Demand The firm asked for a loan to finance an investment?
Credit Approval The credit loan demand has been completely approved
Decision-maker characteristics
Owner The owner of the firm is the decision-maker
Manager outside the firm A manager outside the firm is the decision-maker
Manager inside the firm A manager inside the firm is the decision-maker
Female Gender of the decision-maker of the firm
15-39 ys Age of the decision-maker between 15-39 years
40-49 ys Age of the decision-maker between 40-49 years
50-59 ys Age of the decision-maker between 50-59 years
more than 60 ys Age of the decision-maker greater than 60 years
University or higher University (or higher) level of education of the decision-maker
High school High school level of education of the decision-maker
Middle/Elementary school Middle/Elementary school level of education of the decision-maker
Firm characteristics
Firm Age Age of the Firm
Employees Number of Employees
Female Employees Share of Female Employees
Revenues Amount of revenues
Revenues(log) Amount of revenues expressed in logarithmic form
North The firm is located in the North of Italy
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Centre The firm is located in the Centre of Italy
South The firm is located in the South of Italy
Person/Family major share One person/One Family owns the major share of the firm
Cassa Integrazione The firm opts for layoffs
Reduction Employees The firm opts for a reduction of employees
National group The firm belongs to a national group
Foreign group The firm belongs to a foreign group
No group The firm does not belong to any group
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max N
Credit Demand+++ 0.17 0.38 0 1 20793
Credit Approval+++ 0.87 0.33 0 1 3568
Decision-maker characteristics+++
Female 0.13 0.34 0 1 20793
15-39 ys 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
40-49 ys 0.25 0.44 0 1 20793
50-59 ys 0.36 0.48 0 1 20793
more than 60 ys 0.32 0.47 0 1 20793
University or higher 0.29 0.45 0 1 20793
High school 0.52 0.50 0 1 20793
Middle/Elementary school 0.19 0.39 0 1 20793
Owner 0.86 0.34 0 1 20793
Manager outside the firm 0.05 0.21 0 1 20793
Manager inside the firm 0.09 0.28 0 1 20793
Firm characteristics
Firm Age 26.68 14.98 0 153 20793
Employees 70.34 1052.17 1 144624 20793
Female Employees 0.36 0.32 0 1 20793
Revenues 3.71e+07 1.42e+09 1 1.91e+11 20793
Revenues(log) 14.48 2.05 0 26 20793
North+++ 0.53 0.50 0 1 20793
Centre+++ 0.21 0.41 0 1 20793
South+++ 0.26 0.44 0 1 20793
Person/Family major share+++ 0.46 0.50 0 1 20788
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Cassa Integrazione+++ 0.17 0.38 0 1 17168
Reduction Employees+++ 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
Does the firm belong to a group? +++
National group 0.11 0.32 0 1 20793
Foreign group 0.03 0.18 0 1 20793
No group 0.85 0.35 0 1 20793
REGIONS+++
Piemonte 0.07 0.25 0 1 20793
Valle D’Aosta 0.02 0.13 0 1 20793
Lombardia 0.15 0.36 0 1 20793
Trentino Alto Adige 0.04 0.21 0 1 20793
Veneto 0.09 0.29 0 1 20793
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.04 0.21 0 1 20793
Liguria 0.04 0.19 0 1 20793
Emilia Romagna 0.08 0.27 0 1 20793
Toscana 0.07 0.25 0 1 20793
Umbria 0.03 0.18 0 1 20793
Marche 0.05 0.21 0 1 20793
Lazio 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
Abruzzo 0.03 0.18 0 1 20793
Molise 0.02 0.13 0 1 20793
Campania 0.05 0.21 0 1 20793
Puglia 0.04 0.20 0 1 20793
Basilicata 0.02 0.15 0 1 20793
Calabria 0.02 0.16 0 1 20793
Sicilia 0.04 0.19 0 1 20793
Sardegna 0.03 0.17 0 1 20793
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SECTOR TYPE+++
Mining and Energy 0.04 0.21 0 1 20793
Food and Tobacco 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
Textile, Wood and Publishing 0.07 0.26 0 1 20793
Chemical 0.09 0.29 0 1 20793
Mechanic 0.08 0.27 0 1 20793
Manufacturing 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
Construction 0.13 0.33 0 1 20793
Commerce 0.13 0.34 0 1 20793
Transportation 0.05 0.23 0 1 20793
Hotels and Restaurants 0.05 0.23 0 1 20793
Information and Media 0.05 0.23 0 1 20793
Financial and Insurance Services 0.04 0.19 0 1 20793
Other Services to Companies 0.07 0.26 0 1 20793




Figure 4.1: Credit Demand
Figure 4.2: Credit Approval
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Figure 4.3: Age composition differentiated by gender
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4.7 Appendix B - Regression Tables
Table 4.6: Credit Demand and Approval




15-39 ys 0.0487*** -0.0646**
(0.0131) (0.0288)
40-49 ys 0.0246*** -0.0023
(0.0074) (0.0153)
50-59 ys 0.0107* -0.0191
(0.0064) (0.0140)
University or higher -0.0054 0.0071
(0.0084) (0.0176)




Manager outside the firm -0.0091 -0.0742*
(0.0143) (0.0420)
Firm characteristics
Firm Age -0.0007* -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0009)
Firm Age2 0.0082 0.0001
(0.0050) (0.0102)




Does the firm belong to a group? +++
National group 0.0173* 0.0037
(0.0090) (0.0167)
Foreign group -0.1002*** 0.0041
(0.0092) (0.0417)
N 20793 3557
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Probit estimation model. Marginal effects reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
+++ Dummy variables.
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Table 4.7: Heckman Probit - Coefficients reported




15-39 ys -0.3396*** 0.1817***
(0.0929) (0.0475)
40-49 ys -0.0546 0.0964***
(0.0721) (0.0296)
50-59 ys -0.0996* 0.0426
(0.0564) (0.0266)
University or higher 0.0467 -0.0197
(0.0760) (0.0358)




Manager outside the firm -0.2613 -0.0382
(0.1647) (0.0633)
Firm characteristics
Firm Age 0.0006 -0.0031*
(0.0040) (0.0018)
Firm Age2 -0.0100 0.0336
(0.0441) (0.0209)










Does the firm belong to a group? +++
National group -0.0103 0.0713*
(0.0751) (0.0367)
Foreign group 0.3177 -0.5657***
(0.2369) (0.0801)
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes






Coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: Credit Demand and Approval by Firm Size




Medium Firm 0.0691*** -0.0214
(0.0098) (0.0169)
Large Firm 0.0473*** -0.0282
(0.0174) (0.0331)
Female*Medium Firm -0.0119 0.0476
(0.0206) (0.0316)
Female*Large Firm -0.0035 -0.0319
(0.0472) (0.1085)
15-39 ys 0.0482*** -0.0674**
(0.0131) (0.0288)
40-49 ys 0.0243*** -0.0007
(0.0074) (0.0153)
50-59 ys 0.0105 -0.0181
(0.0064) (0.0139)
University or higher -0.0072 0.0069
(0.0084) (0.0174)




Manager outside the firm -0.0093 -0.0804*
(0.0146) (0.0429)
Firm characteristics
Firm Age -0.0007 -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0009)
Firm Age2 0.0073 0.0005
(0.0050) (0.0102)








Does the firm belong to a group? +++
National group 0.0126 0.0076
(0.0091) (0.0168)
Foreign group -0.1051*** 0.0085
(0.0093) (0.0403)
N 20793 3557
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Probit estimation model. Marginal effects reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
+++ Dummy variables.
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Table 4.9: Credit Demand and Approval by Firm Age




Firm Age below 15ys -0.0020 0.0363
(0.0168) (0.0305)
Firm Age btw 15-30ys 0.0023 0.0335*
(0.0100) (0.0200)
Female*Firm Age below 15ys -0.0001 -0.0242
(0.0203) (0.0476)
Female*Firm Age btw 15-30ys -0.0331** -0.0045
(0.0159) (0.0417)
15-39 ys 0.0477*** -0.0664**
(0.0132) (0.0289)
40-49 ys 0.0252*** -0.0020
(0.0074) (0.0154)
50-59 ys 0.0113* -0.0202
(0.0064) (0.0140)
University or higher -0.0069 0.0074
(0.0084) (0.0174)




Manager outside the firm -0.0094 -0.0808*
(0.0146) (0.0428)
Firm characteristics
Firm Age -0.0007 0.0014
(0.0008) (0.0017)
Firm Age2 0.0080 -0.0082
(0.0071) (0.0142)








Does the firm belong to a group? +++
National group 0.0186** 0.0038
(0.0093) (0.0167)
Foreign group -0.1015*** 0.0057
(0.0097) (0.0408)
N 20793 3557
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Probit estimation model. Marginal effects reported.
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